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Abstract 
This paper studies the post-listing price performance of 390 firms, which 
represented all the firms that were listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
through Initial Public Offerings (IPO) between the years of 1990 and 1998. 
The first focus is to compare the holding rates of return of these stocks 
from the closing price of the first day of trading over the one-year, two-year, and 
three-year horizons, with those of the stock market average. The overall 
observation was that IPO stocks underperformed the market average. Rates of 
return over longer horizons appeared to be even worse than that over shorter 
horizons. This result is consistent with those obtained in other exchanges. 
Even though IPO firms performed poorly, IPO offers in Hong Kong were 
typically over-subscribed by investors. This raises the question whether 
subscribing investors systematically over-estimated the prospects of these stocks. 
In particular, this study raised the question whether those stocks that were 
relatively more over-subscribed, i.e. had larger excess demand for offered stocks 
at the offer price, performed relatively better after listing. To answer this question, 
the holding rates of return of IPO stocks (using the subscription price as the base 
line) were regressed on, among others, the over-subscription ratios. The results 
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showed that those stocks that were more over-subscribed tended to perform better, 
confirming that investors did forecast rationally before they invested. 
In addition, regression results suggested that a bandwagon effect existed. 
Firms listed during years of heated IPO activities tended to perform worse than 
those in quiet years. A possible reason could be that firms of weaker 
fundamentals attempted to cash in during times of IPO frenzies. 
Finally, this study investigated whether the poor performance of IPO 
firms (relative to market average constituent stocks that were typically larger) 
was actually a result of their small market value. While a full-scale study is 
beyond my scope, the findings here, using the sample of all IPO stocks, were 
negative. It was found that there was no conclusive evidence that small IPO 
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The stock price behavior of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) has been one 
of the hot topics in the financial literature. For the post-listing price performance 
of IPOs, many studies on the US stock market and studies on the Asian and 
European financial markets showed that IPOs in different countries 
underperformed the market index in any time period, on average. This long-run 
underperformance of IPOs has been the focus of a large theoretical and empirical 
literature. For the case of Hong Kong, one previous study by Ching (1996) 
showed that there was a significant decline in the post-listing operating 
performance of the firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in 1991 and 
1992. As the sample period was quite short (with only two IPO years), it raises 
the question of whether this anomalous performance is generalizable to other 
years and whether the observation can be attributed to the expectation errors on 
the part of investors. 
Under efficient market hypothesis, it is supposed that once an IPO is 
publicly traded, it is just like any other stock and thus the after-market stock price 
should appropriately reflect the shares' intrinsic value. Consequently, risk-
adjusted post-IPO stock price performance should not be predictable. In this 
sense，post-IPO long-run performance is less of an IPO issue than it is a standard 
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asset-pricing issue. Still, many IPO shares have been difficult to sell short and 
thus have retained some peculiarity even post-IPO. This is the reason why so 
many researchers are interested in examining IPOs. Concerning the poor 
performance of IPOs, it was suggested that IPO stocks take advantage of bull 
markets to launch their listing, because P/E ratios are higher. After listing, stock 
market may go into a bear market. For their underperformance, the reasons 
suggested are that firstly, IPO companies choose to list at the peak of company 
performance. Secondly, they "window-dress" their accounts in a way that make 
investors over-estimate their post-listing earnings. Thirdly, they fail to realize 
their investment plans. Fourthly, investors jump on the bandwagon created by the 
underwriting investment banks and liquidate their shares shortly after listing. 
New issues of common stocks have been the major source of long-term 
financing in Hong Kong. Besides, Hong Kong has established itself as a capital 
formation center for the region as many corporations have listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong. Currently the equity market in Hong Kong consists of 
the Main Board and the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM). The latter was 
established in November 1999. Moreover, Hong Kong has provided most of the 
trading liquidity for China enterprises. At present H-share and Red Chip1 
companies accounted for more than a quarter of the capitalization as well as 
1 H-shares are shares issued by a PRC issuer under PRC law and listed on the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong, the par value of which is denominated in Renminbi, and which are subscribed for and 
traded in Hong Kong dollars. Red chip companies are companies controlled by Chinese ministries, 
provinces or enterprises, but based in Hong Kong. 
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turnover in Hong Kong's equity market. In recent years, 2000 has been an active 
IPO year. There were 90 IPOs listed in 2000, more than double that listed in 1999 
(38 companies). The fund raised was $132 billion Hong Kong dollars, 
representing more than 7.7 times of 1999's total IPO funds raised ($17 billion in 
1999). In particular, three relatively large H-shares and two Red Chip companies 
were listed in 2000 on the Main Board, raising a total of $96 billion Hong Kong 
dollars，compared with six (three H-shares and three Red Chip companies) in 
1999 which raised a total of $6.3 billion Hong Kong dollars. 
For the sample period from 1990 to 1998, the number of ordinary 
companies going public in Hong Kong was 426. The number of IPOs has varied 
from year to year, with 1997 being the busiest year (82 IPOs listed) and 1990 
being the quietest year (14 IPOs listed). According to the results discussed in later 
chapters, an investor buying shares during this period at the first-day closing price 
and holding them for one year, two years and three years respectively, the 
average monthly return of the IPOs underperformed that of the Hang Seng Index, 
which represents the market index of the Hong Kong Stock market, by 1.9 
percent, 2.54 percent and 2.53 percent respectively 
In Hong Kong, over-subscription for IPOs has been a very common 
phenomenon. For the IPOs listed between the years of 1990 and 1998, the largest 
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subscription rate2 was 1276 of Beijing enterprises Holdings Ltd, listed in 1997. 
The median subscription rate in this period was 17.32，showing that IPOs in Hong 
Kong were substantially over-subscribed. In theory, if investors do not make 
systematic expectation errors in forecasting the iuture performance of IPO firms, 
then firms that are more over-subscribed should reflect a greater excess demand 
at the offer price, and therefore a larger potential of price appreciation after listing. 
Even if IPO firms as a whole perform poorly relative to the market, the more a 
firm is over-subscribed, the better should be its price performance relative to IPO 
firms that are less over-subscribed. This hypothesis was tested using HK stocks 
data in this study. 
Averages hide the time trends and year-by-year variation in the stock 
price performance of the IPOs. As shown by previous studies, the long-run 
performance of IPOs varies over time. For example, the three-year market-
adjusted buy-and-hold average returns may be negative in every subperiod, but 
not for every cohort year. Therefore, one would like to investigate whether the 
variation in sample period affects the conclusions, which sub-sample(s) of year(s) 
is(are) responsible for the change and why there is such a change in that particular 
time period. This study divided the full sample period into three sub-periods— 
1990-1992，1993-1995 and 1996-1998. The aim is to see whether the time-
2 Subscription rate as used by the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong is defined as the ratio of the 
number of shares subscribed to the number of shares offered. 
4 
variation in sample period generates different findings and check whether the 
conclusions under the full sample period are consistent across all sub-periods. 
Some previous studies in the US suggested that IPOs are strongly tilted 
towards small growth firms, and this has been the worst-performing style 
category of the last several decades. In other words, underperformance is not 
exclusively an IPO effect. When issuing firms are matched to size and book-to-
market portfolios that exclude all recent firms that have issued equity, IPOs do 
not underperform. Underperformance is a characteristic of small, low book-to-
market firms regardless of whether they are IPO firms or not. 
In view of the results in the US, the IPOs included in the present study 
were classified into three groups according to market value- Small, Medium and 
Large. The purpose of this classification is to examine the average market-
adjusted returns of IPOs within the groups and check whether small IPO stocks 
performed worse than large IPO stocks. Besides using the whole sample for 
investigation, different sample periods were used to gauge the robustness of the 
result. 
In measuring the long-run performance, most studies adopted the market-
adjusted approach to show the performance of the IPOs relative to a benchmark. 
This method assumes that all firms have the same systematic risk as the market 
5 
portfolio3. The excess return for a security is then defined as the difference 
between the individual asset return and the corresponding market return. Some 
studies adopted the style-adjusted approach to show the performance of the IPOs 
relative to the existing stocks of similar size and market capitalization. However, 
the criteria of selecting the matching firms still have much ambiguity. Therefore, 
the matching firm approach was not adopted in this study. Concerning the 
holding period, three-year and five-year buy-and-hold horizons were the most 
commonly used holding periods. This study used the former which was the 
longest duration of holding the IPOs. 
To sum up, this study has focused on three areas concerning the stock 
price behavior of IPOs. The first focus is the relationship between subscription 
rates and market-adjusted average monthly returns of the IPOs. The second focus 
is the stock price performance and in particular, the post-listing price performance 
of the IPOs over one-year, two-year and three-year buy-and-hold horizons. The 
third focus is to investigate whether "Small" IPOs performed poorer than "Large" 
IPOs and whether the variation in sample period affected the findings. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Chapter two is 
literature review. Chapter three describes the sample data and methodology. 
3 Adjusting for risk would imply that IPOs should command a risk premium, i.e. yielding higher 
returns relative to the market average. 
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Chapter four reports the results. Chapter five is the discussion part and lastly 




There are many aspects to the IPO literature. One fundamental question 
was that why firms choose to go public. Zingales (1995) suggested that when a 
firm goes public, it is much easier to be recognized by a potential acquirer for a 
takeover action. Besides, going public can help entrepreneurs to benefit from a 
higher value if their firm is acquired than what they would get from an outright 
sale. On the other hand, Black and Gilson (1998) pointed out that IPO is regarded 
a common way by the entrepreneurs of venture capital-backed companies to 
regain control over their firms from the venture capitalists. Thus, many IPOs are 
not so much exits for the entrepreneur as they are for the venture capitalists. 
Another paper by Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) found that the 
company's size and the industry's market-to-book ratio have a positive effect on 
the likelihood of an IPO by studying a unique database of private firms in Italy. 
Besides, they found that it is likely for the companies to benefit from reduction in 
costs of credit and increase in turnover in control through going public. 
Remarkably, they also found that IPO activity followed high investment and 
growth, not vice versa. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) proposed that the 
operation of a firm follows a life cycle. At the early stage, the firm will be private. 
But later when it grows sufficiently large, it becomes optimal to go public. Under 
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their study, there is a trade-off for the entrepreneur between reducing financial 
costs (compared to venture capitalist financing) and higher information costs 
when the firm goes public. According to Chemmanur and Fulghieri, the 
undiversified portfolios held by venture capitalists make them unwilling to pay a 
price as high as the one paid by public-market investors who hold relatively 
diversified portfolios. Besides, going public involves fixed costs. Moreover, 
information about the firm cannot be costlessly revealed, so small investors have 
difficulties in getting access to the full information of the firms, i.e. asymmetric 
information exists. Therefore, it is ideal for firms to go public when they grow 
sufficiently large in their life cycle. 
The performance of IPOs has been another interesting topic for research. 
In the United States, there have been many studies on the returns earned by 
investing in IPOs. For example, Ritter (1991) showed that IPOs appeared to be 
overpriced in the long run. He studied a sample of 1526 IPOs of common stock 
that went public in the United States from 1975 to 1984. He found that in the 
three years after going public, these IPO firms significantly underperformed as 
compared to a set of comparable firms matched by size and industry. The average 
holding period return for the IPO sample was 34.47% in the three years after 
going public where the holding period returns were measured from the closing 
prices on the day of listing to the closing prices of the three-year anniversaries. 
For the matching-firm sample, the average total return was 61.86% over the same 
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three-year holding period. Therefore, every dollar invested in a portfolio of IPOs 
purchased at the closing prices on the day of listing resulted in a terminal wealth 
of $1.3447，while every dollar invested in a portfolio of the matching firms 
resulted in $1.6186, meaning a ratio of only 0.813. As a result, IPOs 
underperformed in the long run. Moreover, their findings also indicated that the 
underperformance was concentrated among relatively young growth companies, 
especially those going public in the high-volume years of the 1980s. Ritter's 
paper also provided evidence that many firms went public near the peak of 
industry-specific fads, that is, issuers successfully timed offers to lower their cost 
of capital. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) also showed that IPOs were poor long-run 
investments for investors. They studied the IPOs and seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) that were listed during the 1970-1990 period in separate samples. They 
calculated the three-year and five-year post-offering rate of return for each stock 
in the sample and compared it with a same-size stock (in terms of market 
capitalization) that did not make any equity offering in the three or five year 
period. The findings for the IPOs were that they generally yielded a lower rate of 
return than non-IPO firms of similar size. There were only four exceptional years 
in which IPO firms subsequently gave higher returns than non-IPO firms. 
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For the five years after listing, they found that investors received an 
average return of only 5% per year. However, investing an equal amount of 
money at the same time, in a non-issuing firm with approximately the same 
market capitalization, and holding it for an identical horizon, would have 
produced an average compound return of 12% per year. This implies that 44% 
more money needed to be invested in the IPOs than in the existing firms of the 
same size to have the same wealth five years after the day of listing. In addition, 
even holding both size and the book-to-market ratio constant, they showed that 
IPOs had lower subsequent returns than their counterpart of existing firms. 
Loughran and Ritter's study also showed that the poor performance 
seemed to be related to the number of IPOs in the year, meaning that some 
opportunistic firms made use of positive market sentiments to go public. Besides, 
because IPO firms have no market track record, they should be viewed as being 
riskier than non-IPO firms. Therefore, we should expect them to generate a higher 
return than non-IPO firms. However, the data suggested just the opposite. 
For reasons why investors might overvalue IPO stocks, Loughran and 
Ritter suggested that probable reasons centered around asymmetric information. 
Investors have less information than the firms' pre-IPO owners who try their best 
in making up good financial figures, and time their IPO at the peak of company 
performance. Investors are easily misled. According to their study, what was 
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puzzling was that it took the investors up to five years to realize that they had 
been misled. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) offered similar explanation. They 
attributed some of the poor post-listing price performance to "optimistic" 
accounting in the early life of the firm. Firms pay efforts to "window-dressing" 
when they conduct their IPOs, and that the market has difficulties in detecting 
any potential problems of the firms because of asymmetric information. This 
suggested that at least a part of the poor long-run performance is attributed by the 
over-optimistic investors who fail to forecast tougher times ahead properly. 
The same conclusion holds for the SEO sample in Loughran and Ritter's 
paper. SEO firms from all years except two subsequently performed worse than 
non-SEO firms of similar size. According to Loughran and Ritter, the possible 
explanations were that firms timed their SEOs in accordance with market 
valuation for their shares. The higher the market valuation, the lower would be 
the cost of the SEO. Here what was puzzling was that the market did not discount 
valuation immediately after the announcement of SEO. What we observed was 
the market being disappointed repeatedly for up to five years after the SEO. 
Another empirical study by Brav and Gompers (1997) examined the long-
run underperformance of IPO firms. Their sample consists of 934 venture-backed 
IPOs from 1972 to 1992 and 3407 non-venture-backed IPOs from 1975 to 1992. 
They found that venture-backed IPOs had superior performance as compared to 
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non-venture-backed IPOs using equal-weighed returns. However, their 
performance differences were not robust when value-weighting approach by 
NYSE/AMEX was used. This was because the underperformance for non-
venture-backed IPOs was significantly reduced. They further did tests using 
several comparable benchmarks and the Fama-French (1993) three-factor asset 
pricing model and also found that venture-backed companies did not significantly 
underperform. On the other hand, the smallest non-venture-backed firms did 
show poor performance because of the negative intercepts for portfolios of small 
growth firms under Fama-French 3-factor regressions, no matter the portfolio was 
composed of IPOs or not. Also, they showed that IPOs mainly consist of small 
growth firms. As a result, one of the major conclusions from their study is that 
underperformance was not an IPO effect. Firms of similar size and book-to-
market ratios that had not gone public performed as poorly as IPOs. 
Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) also studied the long-run 
underperformance of IPO firms. They studied 2292 IPOs which were listed 
between the years of 1979 and 1991. Value-weighting CRSP Index was used to 
calculate the market-adjusted returns of the IPO stocks. The result was that over a 
three-year buy-and-hold horizon, the market-adjusted average return of the IPO 
stocks was-19.92%. They also calculated the initial returns and the market-
adjusted average initial return was 8.08%. These positive initial returns and the 
subsequent long-run negative market-adjusted returns are consistent with the 
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findings from previous studies. Besides, they found that the long-run 
underperformance of IPO stocks relative to the market over a three-year buy-and-
hold horizon and the short-run underpricing were less obvious for IPOs handled 
by more well-known underwriters. 
For Asian financial markets, Huang (1999) examined both the short-run 
and long-run price performance of 311 IPOs listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
from 1971 through 1985. He found that the underpricing of IPO stocks was 
significant as the market-adjusted initial return was 42.6% on the first day of 
trading. The cumulative excess returns estimated by the market model were -
1.5% (t = -0.15) and -3.9% (t = -0.47) over the 24-day holding period and the 
four-year holding period respectively, both starting from the first day of trading. 
Thus, it was shown that beyond the first day of trading, investors could not earn 
abnormal returns of the IPOs. Also, he pointed out that there was no relationship 
between the long-run performance of IPOs and the initial risk-adjusted return. 
These results were consistent with those in previous studies. 
One most recent study by Ritter and Welch (2002) examined 6249 IPOs 
which were listed in the US during the period 1980 to 2001. They investigated the 
long-run performance of these IPO stocks by calculating the average three-year 
buy-and-hold returns in three aspects: the IPOs (absolute performance), market-
adjusted and style-adjusted returns. Market-adjusted returns were calculated as 
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the difference between the return of an IPO and the compounded daily return on 
the CRSP value-weighted index of Amex, Nasdaq and NYSE firms over a three-
year buy-and-hold horizon. Style-adjusted returns were calculated as the three-
year buy-and-hold return of an IPO minus the corresponding return of a style-
matched firm in terms of the closest market capitalization and book-to-market 
ratio and which has been listed for at least five years. 
The results showed that the average three-year buy-and-hold absolute 
return during the period 1980 to 2001 was 22.6%. However, the corresponding 
market-adjusted return was -23.4%, meaning that investing in the value-weighted 
market portfolio would have yielded about twice the return than from investing in 
an equal-weighted portfolio of the IPOs over a three-year horizon. As a result, it 
is obvious that equally-weighted post-IPO returns have been low relative to the 
market indices. One possible reason given by Ritter and Welch was that IPOs 
tend to be small growth firms, and this has been the category of firms that showed 
the worst performance over the last several decades. This actually implies that the 
poor post-listing price performance of IPOs is not because they are IPOs, but 
probably because they are "small growth firms". This explanation is consistent 
with that from Brav and Gompers (1997). 
On the other hand, the average three-year buy-and-hold style-adjusted 
return for the whole period 1980 to 2001 was -5.1%. However, if one looks into 
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the subperiods and cohorts of years in the sample, the style-adjusted buy-and-
hold returns were not as reliably negative, because many cohorts of year and 
some subperiods had positive average three-year buy-and-hold style-adjusted 
returns. 
As a result, Ritter and Welch concluded that compared to publicly traded 
firms that were similar in market capitalization and book-to-market ratios, IPOs 
have had very modest underperformance indeed. It is obvious that firms "similar 
to IPO firms" also showed poor long-run performance, meaning that the poor 
long-run price performance extends beyond the IPO market. The results that the 
three-year average market-adjusted return on IPOs was -23.4% whereas the 
average style-adjusted return was -5.1%. provided evidence that publicly traded 
firms that were similar in market capitalization and book-to-market ratios 
underperformed the market indices by almost as much as IPOs did. 
Besides, Ritter and Welch pointed out that the time period chosen for the 
studies may affect the conclusions. In their study, there is variation in the long-
run performance of IPOs over time. Thus, their results are sensitive to the exact 
time period chosen. For example, the market-adjusted returns of the IPOs over a 
three-year buy-and-hold horizon were negative in every subperiod, but not in 
every cohort year, with 1988, 1989, 1997 and 1998 showing positive market-
adjusted returns. Style-adjusted buy-and-hold returns also exhibit similar situation, 
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with many cohorts and some subperiods yielding positive style-adjusted buy-and-
hold returns. Besides, they found out that depending on whether and how one 
includes 1999, 2000 and 2001 which are the years of the Internet bubble, one can 
reach quite different results. Therefore, they suggested that one should be careful 
when comparing articles and should pay special attention to the sample periods 
chosen for the studies because probably the sample period is crucial for some of 
the conclusions. 
Underpricing is another typical phenomenon of IPOs and it is another 
focus for researchers. For example, Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) 
summarized the empirical results of IPO underpricing all over the world and 
compared the degree of underpricing across countries. Their study covers 25 
countries, including well-developed markets such as the US, UK and Japan as 
well as some emerging markets such as Korea, China, Taiwan and Thailand. 
The level of underpricing ranged from 4.2% of France to 80.3% of 
Malaysia. They argued that there were three reasons underlying IPO underpricing: 
(i) difference in selling mechanism; (ii) difference in the characteristics of the 
firms going public; (iii) difference in institutional constraints. They also 
suggested that if the contract used in IPOs gave the underwriter greater ability in 
discretionary allocation of shares and price discrimination in the pricing of IPOs, 
the level of underpricing would be greater. However, by comparing the 
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characteristics of contracts in different countries, they found no evidence to 
support this notion. Instead, the timing of setting the subscription price was found 
to be useful in explaining the degree of underpricing. The return of new issue was 
higher when the subscription price was set before the information acquisition. In 
the US, it was also found that best effort offerings were underpriced more than 
firm commitment offerings. Moreover, high level of underpricing was usually 
observed in the emerging market or market with a great degree of government 
interference. 
Concerning the reasons of underpricing, according to Ritter and Welch 
(2002), theories can be basically classified into three categorizes: (i) theories 
based on asymmetric information; (ii) theories based on symmetric information; 
(iii) theories based on the allocation and trading of IPO shares. Among the three, 
asymmetric information models have been the most popular among researchers, 
as mentioned by Ritter and Welch. All theories of underpricing based on 
asymmetric information propose that underpricing is positively related to the 
degree of asymmetric information. However, Ritter and Welch pointed out that 
these models have been overemphasized. They mentioned that there is no sole 
theoretical cause for underpricing with overwhelming importance. One reason 
can be of more importance for some firms and/or at some times. Thus, they 
proposed that non-rational and agency conflict explanations should deserve more 
emphasis instead. 
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For studies about the Hong Kong stock market, one of the earliest papers 
was by Dawson (1987)，which investigated the secondary market price 
performance of IPOs in Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia during the period 
1978 to 1984. Dawson's paper showed that the markets adjusted rapidly to the 
new information and by the first day of trading excess returns were no longer 
available to purchasers in the secondary market. On average, the initial return 
after adjusting for market movement was 13.8%. In addition, investors who 
bought in the secondary market were unlikely to earn excess returns on average 
over various trading periods ranging from one day to twelve months. The results 
provided evidence that the market priced IPOs efficiently in Hong Kong since 
prices adjusted rapidly to the underpricing of the IPOs. However, his sample of 
study was rather small, with only 21 IPOs during that period for investigation. 
McGuinness (1992) re-examined the degree of underpricing of IPOs in 
Hong Kong. He studied the 80 IPOs which were listed within 1980 to mid-1990 
in Hong Kong. His investigation about the post-listing returns by investing in 
these IPOs indicated that significant positive returns occurred on the first day of 
trading and disappeared thereafter. He reported that the market-adjusted initial 
return of these IPOs amounted to 17.6% on average, which was significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level. However, the average excess return after the 
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first trading day was around zero. This implied that the underpricing was 
eliminated quickly in early trading. 
Another paper by McGuinness (1993) showed that unseasoned Hong 
Kong stocks issued during 1980 to 1990 yielded unfavourable long-term returns. 
Measuring the returns from their first closing traded prices to their closing prices 
within a 24-month (500-day trading) post-listing period indicated that the 
favourable returns within the first months of listing were reversed leading to a 
longer term decline in returns. The returns examined within the first 12 months of 
listing were insignificantly different from zero but significant negative returns 
th « 
were evidenced between the first days of listing of the stocks and the 400 and 
500th days of listing respectively. The results implied that investments in 
unseasoned Hong Kong stocks appeared to be of questionable value over longer 
term. 
Later, Kang and Lui (1994) examined the 147 IPOs listed during the 
period of 1986 to 1992. They addressed the question of why discriminatory 
allocation existed for IPO stocks, i.e. a disproportionately large amount of shares 
allocated to small investors. They developed summary measures for allocation 
bias and studied a set of issue-specific, firm- and underwriter-specific, as well as 
market-specific determinants of the variations in allocation bias among the IPOs. 
Their findings were that (i) there was less (more) allocation bias if the 
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underwriters were relatively more (less) active because more (less) active 
underwriters tended to adopt less (more) biased allocation schemes and (ii) the 
explanatory variables of subscription rate，public equity ownership, firm size, and 
an industry dummy do not explain the variation in allocation bias across IPOs. 
Apart from the price performance, the operating performance has been 
another aspect for studying IPOs. For example, Jain and Kini (1994) studied the 
more general operating performance of the IPOs in the United States. The paper 
investigated the change in the operating performance of 682 IPO firms as they 
made the transition from private to public ownership during the period 1976 to 
1988. Measured by operating return on assets and operating cash flows deflated 
by assets, the operating performance of IPOs showed a significant decline in the 
post-issue period, both before and after industry adjustment. The sample firms 
exhibited high growth in sales and capital expenditures relative to firms in the 
same industry in the post-IPO period. 
Thus, the declining operating performance of IPO firms could not be 
attributed to a lack of sales growth opportunities or cutbacks in post-IPO capital 
expenditures. IPO firms in which entrepreneurs retained higher ownership 
generally demonstrated superior performance relative to other issuing firms both 
before and after adjustment for industry effects. 
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For the IPOs in Hong Kong, the study by Ching (1996) also showed that 
there was a significant decline in operating performance subsequent to the IPOs, 
measured by operating return on assets and operating profit margin. The study 
investigated the change in the post-listing operating performance of the 99 firms 
listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in 1991 and 1992. The operating 
performance of IPO firms was compared with other listed firms matched with 
similar business and size. 
The results also showed that the decline in the performance of IPOs could 
not be attributed to the industry effect and lack of sales opportunities. In this 
study, agency cost problem, window dressing and peak timing issue were 
proposed to explain the decline in the operating performance of the IPOs. The 
conclusions were that agency cost problem appeared to explain the decline in the 
IPO performance. Peak timing issue and agency cost explanation both received 
support in the comparison among Hong Kong manufacturing sector, 
manufacturing IPOs and manufacturing matching firms. However, window 
dressing did not get any support in both cases. 
After studying the previous literature, especially those in Hong Kong, as 
the question of whether the poor post-listing price performance of IPOs could be 
attributed to the expectation errors on the part of investors remain an unresolved 
issue, the present study attempted to address this issue by examining the 
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relationship between subscription rates and the holding rates of return (with 
subscription prices as the base line) of the 390 IPOs listed on the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong from 1990 to 1998. This is because even if IPOs as a whole 
perform poorly relative to the market, the more a firm is over-subscribed, the 
higher should be its holding rates of return relative to the IPOs that are less over-
subscribed. This hypothesis was tested using Hong Kong stocks data in the 
present study. Also, subscription rate was included as one of the explanatory 
variables in the regression models to determine its effect on the holding rates of 
return of the IPOs with subscription prices as the base line and with closing prices 
on the first day of trading as the base line respectively. 
Besides, the present study examined the post-listing price performance of 
IPOs in Hong Kong over a longer period of time, from 1990 to 1998 to see 
whether the poor post-listing price performance of IPOs found in previous 
literature also existed in Hong Kong and more importantly, whether the 
phenomenon was robust over a longer time period. 
Moreover, size effect of the IPOs as proposed by previous studies like the 
one by Brav and Gompers (1997) was investigated in the present study by 
classifying the 390 IPOs into three market value groups—"Small", "Medium" 
and "Large" and then comparing the holding rates of return among the three 
groups. In particular, the returns of "Small" IPOs was compared with those of 
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"Large" IPOs over the three buy-and-hold horizons and their differences were 
verified by the t-test with 95% confidence interval. Also, size effect was included 
as one of the explanatory variables in the regression models to examine its 
significance in the Hong Kong stock market. 
As the recent study by Ritter and Welch (2002) pointed out the critical 
effect of sample period in affecting the conclusions, the above findings 
concerning the size effect of IPOs under the whole sample period in the present 
study were tested for robustness by using different sub-periods. In other words, 
the assertion by Ritter and Welch (2002) that the results were sensitive to the 
sample period chosen according to the US stocks data was verified by using HK 
stocks data in the present study. Also, the finding from previous studies like the 
one by Loughran and Ritter (1995) that the poor performance of IPOs seemed to 
be related to the number of IPOs in the year was verified through the two dummy 




Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data description 
3.1.1 Choice of IPO firms 
The sample chosen to form the database was the firms that processed 
IPOs from 1990 to 1998. A total of 390 IPO firms were included in this study. 
Table 1 summarizes the number of IPO firms in Hong Kong from 1990 to 1998 
included in this study. 
Sample period started from 1990 because the prospectuses of the IPO 
firms listed from 19864 to 1989 were incomplete and the information on 
subscription rates of these IPO firms was not available. Therefore, the IPO firms 
of these years were excluded from the sample. Also, a three-year window on the 
post-listing price performance of this study meant that 1998 was the latest 
practicable year for this study. Therefore, the IPO firms listed after 1998 were 
excluded as well. 
From 1990 to 1998, there were actually 451 newly listed companies as 
given in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong's Fact Book 1990-1998. However, 
4 1986 was the year of establishment of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. 
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only ordinary companies were included in this study. Investment companies, in 
the nature of investment funds, were excluded from the sample. As a result, 25 
investment companies listed between 1990 and 1998 were excluded from the 
sample. 
Among the remaining 426 ordinary companies listed between 1990 and 
1998, only 390 of them were included in this study. The reasons for exclusion 
were, first, some companies were listed by introduction, meaning that shares were 
not offered for subscription, and second, the information for a few companies' 
post-listing was incomplete. 
3.1.2 Subscription rates and market values5 
For subscription rates, among the 390 IPO firms in the sample, the 
smallest one was 0.11 of Shun Cheong Holdings Ltd listed in 1992，while the 
largest one was 1276 of Beijing enterprises Holdings Ltd listed in 1997. The 
median was 17.32. For market values, the smallest one was 32 million Hong 
Kong dollars of Q-Tech Holdings Ltd listed in 1998 while the largest one was 
156684 million Hong Kong dollars of China Telecom Ltd listed in 1997. The 
median was 472 million Hong Kong dollars. 
5 For details, please refer to appendix 
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3.2 Data sources 
The names of the IPO firms were obtained from the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong's Fact Book 1990-1998. Subscription rates of the IPO firms were 
obtained from the Fact Books as well. The Fact Books also provide information 
on the listing date, the amount of funds raised, subscription price (from Fact Book 
1995 onwards), number of shares offered (from Fact Book 1997 onwards) and the 
sponsor/ underwriter (from Fact Book 1997 onwards) of the IPO firms. For the 
subscription prices of the IPO firms listed from 1990 to 1994, which cannot be 
obtained from the Fact Book, the prospectuses of these IPO firms were consulted. 
For the information on post-listing price performance, the closing prices 
of the IPO firms were extracted from the on-line database DATASTREAM. Also, 
the information on the performance of the Hang Seng Indices in the 
corresponding period of each IPO firm was extracted from DATASTREAM as 
well. For the market values of the IPO firms, information was obtained from 
another online database PACAP. 
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3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Measure of correlations between subscription rates and market-
adjusted average monthly rates of return (MAAMRORsub丨POs) of the IPO 
firms 
The monthly closing prices from the day of listing to the three-year 
anniversary trading day of each of the 390 IPO firms were extracted from the on-
line database DATASTREAM. These prices were adjusted closing prices6, as 
opposed to "raw" closing prices. Adjusted closing prices are "raw" closing prices 
after adjustments for subsequent capital actions- bonus and rights issues. The 
factors of price adjustment consist of six types of issue: rights issues; scrip issues; 
capital reorganization- typically a stock subdivision which is treated as a scrip, or 
a stock consolidation which is treated as a reverse scrip; open offers- treated as 
rights issues; distributions- issues into another line of stock, which can be rights 
or scrip and stock dividends- treated as scrip issues. 
From the monthly closing prices, the monthly rates of return of the IPO 
firms (MROR,POs) were calculated by the formula: 
MROR IPOsi,j = (Pi, j-PM, j)/PMj ⑴ 
6 Adjusted closing prices are the default datatypes for all equities in DATASTREAM 
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where MRORIPOsj, j = the monthly rate of return of the ith month after 
listing for the jth IPO firm 
Pi，j = the monthly closing price of the ith month after listing for the jth 
IPO firm 
Pj.ij = the monthly closing price of the (i-l)th month after listing for the 
jth IPO firm 
Then the method of geometric average was used to generate the average monthly 
rates of return of the IPO firms (AMRORIPOs) over one-year buy-and-hold, two-
year buy-and-hold and three-year buy-and-hold horizons. 
In order to generate the market-adjusted average monthly rates of return 
of each IPO firm, the monthly Hang Seng Indices (HSI) in the corresponding 
period of each IPO firm were collected from DATASTREAM. Like the 
calculations of the average monthly rates of return of the IPO firms, the monthly 
rates of return of the HSI (MRORHSI) were first obtained by the formula: 
MRORHSIij = (HSIi.j — HSI^j) / HSI^ j (2) 
where MRORHSIi,j = the monthly rate of return of the HSI in the ith 
month after listing of the jth IPO firm 
HSIjj = the monthly HSI of the ith month after listing of the jth IPO firm 
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H S IMJ = the monthly HSI of the (i-l)th month after listing of the jth IPO 
firm 
Then, similarly, the method of geometric average was used to generate the 
average monthly rates of return of the HSI (AMRORHSI) over one-year buy-and-
hold, two-year buy-and-hold and three-year buy-and-hold horizons. 
Finally，the market-adjusted average monthly rates of return of the IPO 
firms (MAAMROR1POs) over one-year buy-and-hold, two-year buy-and-hold and 
three-year buy-and-hold horizons were calculated by subtracting the average 
monthly rates of return of the HSI from the average monthly rates of return of the 
corresponding IPO firms over the same horizon. That is, 
MAAMROR1POsj，K = AMRORlp0sj，K - AMRORH S I j , K (3) 
where j = the jth IPO firm 
k = one-year buy-and-hold, two-year buy-and-hold or three-year buy-and-
hold horizons 
These MAAMROR ,POs were the ones used to show the post-listing price 
performance of the IPO firms in the sample. 
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For measuring the correlation between subscription rates and the 
MAAMRORIPOs in this part, the subscription prices were used as the first prices 
in the series. That is, in this part, 
P0,j = the subscription price of the jth IPO firm 
As a result, MAAMRORsub
1POs was used to remind us that subscription prices 
were used as the initial prices. Also, correlations were defined as one-year, two-
year and three-year correlations which were the correlations between subscription 
rates and the MAAMRORsub
IPOs over one-year buy-and-hold, two-year buy-and-
hold and three-year buy-and-hold horizons respectively. 
3.3.2 Measure of the post-listing price performance of the IPO firms 
For measuring the post-listing price performance of the IPO firms, the 
MAAMRORIPOs, which were calculated in the same way as described in the 
previous section 3.3.1，were used. The difference was that the MAAMRORIPOs 
were calculated using all post-listing prices so that the closing prices on the day 
of listing of the IPO firms were used as the first prices in the series. That is, in 
this part, 
P0 j = the closing price of the jth IPO firm in the 0
th month after its listing, 
i.e. the closing price on the first day of listing 
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3丄3 Classifications of the IPO firms by year and by market value for 
comparison 
The correlations, one-year buy-and-hold, two-year buy-and-hold and 
three-year buy-and-hold MAAMRORsub
IPOs and MAAMROR IPOs were 
categorized by year respectively for comparison among the IPO years. Also, they 
were categorized by groups of market value respectively for comparison among 
the groups. Within the same IPO year, the MAAMRORsub
1POs and 
MAAMROR丨POs were averaged respectively. Similarly, within the same groups of 
market value, they were averaged respectively. The values were compared with 
each other in the category to see whether a particular IPO year or a particular 
group of market value yielded a significantly different correlation and rate of 
return. 
For the category "year", there were a total of nine years, 1990 to 1998，for 
comparison. For the category "market value’，，there were totally three groups, 
which were small, medium and large7. "Small" market value group was defined 
as those IPO firms with their market values less than or equal to 300 million 
Hong Kong dollars at the end of their IPO years. "Medium" market value group 
was defined as those IPO firms with their market values greater than 300 and less 
than or equal to 900 million Hong Kong dollars at the end of their IPO years. 
7 The dividing lines among the market value groups were chosen so as to divide the sample evenly 
into three groups. 
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"Large" market value group was defined as those IPO firms with their market 
values greater than 900 million Hong Kong dollars at the end of their IPO years, 
i.e. 
"Small" market value = < 300 million Hong Kong dollars 
"Medium" market value = > 300 & < 900 million Hong Kong dollars 
"Large" market value = > 900 million Hong Kong dollars 
(All market values of the IPO firms were taken at the end of their IPO 
years) 
According to these classifications, there were 133 "Small" IPO firms, 144 
"Medium" IPO firms and 113 "Large" IPO firms out of the 390 IPO firms in the 
sample. 
In order to investigate whether the differences in the post-listing price 
performance among the three market value groups might be affected by which 
IPO years were under consideration, apart from including all IPO years in the 
sample for classifying the IPO firms' market values, i.e. a full sample of 390 IPO 
firms, the IPO firms were further divided into three sub-samples first according to 
their IPO years and then classified by their market values again for comparison. 
The three sub-samples according to the IPO years were 1990-1992 sub-sample, 
1993-1995 sub-sample and 1996-1998 sub-sample. The corresponding numbers 
of IPO firms in "Small", "Medium" and "Large" market value groups were 45,46 
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and 18; 31, 57 and 44; 57, 41 and 51 for the 1990-1992 sub-sample, 1993-1995 
sub-sample and 1996-1998 sub-sample respectively. 
This was to check whether the findings from the full sample were 
consistent across all sub-periods. For example, if from the full sample, it was 
found that "Small，，IPO firms tended to have a poorer price performance than 
"Large" IPO firms, this finding would be compared with those from the sub-
samples to see whether it was really the market values which affected the post-
listing price performance or it was somehow ambiguous as it depended on which 
IPO years were under consideration, i.e. how the sample period was defined. 
In the category "market value", t-test with 95% confidence interval was 
used to test the statistical significance of the differences of "Small" versus 
"Medium" IPO firms, "Small" versus "Large" IPO firms and "Medium" versus 
"Large" IPO firms for their one-year buy-and-hold, two-year buy-and-hold, and 
three-year buy-and-hold MAAMRORsub
IPOs and MAAMRORIPOs respectively. 
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3.3.4 Regression 
3.3.4.1 Regression of the MAAMRORsub
IPOs on subscription rates, year types 
and market value groups 
In this part, the MAAMRORsub
IPOs over one-year, two-year and three-year 
buy-and-hold horizons were regressed on subscription rates, year types and 
market value groups. 
The regression equation was: 
MAAMRORsub
IPOs = 7o + r iSUB + 7*2 Q-YR + T3 B-YR + 74 S-
MKV + rsL-MKV + e (4) 
where MAAMRORsub
IPOs = MAAMRORIPOs with subscription prices as 
the base line 
SUB = subscription rates of the IPO firms which were expressed in values 
of natural logarithms 
Q-YR = “Quiet” year which was a dummy variable coded 1 if the IPO 
firm was listed in the year where there was less than 28 listings of IPO 
firms; coded 0 otherwise 
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B-YR = "Busy" year which was a dummy variable coded 1 if the IPO 
firm was listed in the year where there was more than 50 listings of IPO 
firms; coded 0 otherwise 
S-MKV = "Small" market value group which was a dummy variable 
coded 1 if the IPO firm was in "Small" market value group; coded 0 
otherwise 
L-MKV = "Large" market value group which was a dummy variable 
coded 1 if the IPO firm was in "Large" market value group; coded 0 
otherwise 
For the explanatory variables, the subscription rates were expressed in 
values of natural logarithms in order to reduce the extremely large deviations of 
the original values (the lowest subscription rate of 0.11 and the largest 
subscription rate of 1276). Year types were defined as "Quiet", "Moderate" and 
"Busy" where "Quiet" year was defined as those IPO years with less than or 
equal to 28 listings of IPO firms, "Moderate" year was defined as those IPO years 
with 29 to 50 listings of IPO firms and "Busy" year was defined as those IPO 
years with more than 50 listings of IPO firms. Under this classification, 1990, 
1995 and 1998 were classified as "Quiet" years; 1991, 1994 and 1996 were 
classified as "Moderate" years; 1992，1993 and 1997 were classified as "Busy" 
years. 
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In this regression, "Moderate" year was chosen as the base case. 
Therefore, only "Quiet" year and "Busy" year appeared in the regression equation. 
Market value groups were defined as those in section 3.3.3. Similar to year types, 
only "Small" market value group and "Large" market value group appeared in the 
regression equation as "Medium" market value group was chosen as the base case. 
95% confidence interval was used to test the statistical significance of 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
3.3.4.2 Regression of the post-listing MAAMROR IPOs on subscription rates, 
year types and market value groups 
In this part, the MAAMRORIPOs (with closing prices on the day of listing 
as the first prices in the series) over one-year buy-and-hold, two-year buy-and-
hold and three-year buy-and-hold horizons were regressed on the subscription 
rates, year types and market value groups. 
The regression equation was: 
MAAMRORIPOs = r o + r i S U B + r 2 Q-YR + r 3 B-YR + r 4 S-MKV 
+ r 5 L-MKV + 8 (5) 
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where MAAMRORIPOs = post-listing MAAMRORIPOs with closing prices 
on the day of listing as the first prices in the series 
SUB = subscription rates of the IPO firms which were expressed in values 
of natural logarithms 
Q-YR = "Quiet" year, a dummy variable coded 1 if the IPO firm was 
listed in the year where there was less than 28 listings of IPO firms; coded 
0 otherwise 
B-YR = "Busy" year, a dummy variable coded 1 if the IPO firm was listed 
in the year where there was more than 50 listings of IPO firms; coded 0 
otherwise 
S-MKV = "Small" market value group, a dummy variable coded 1 if the 
IPO firm was in "Small" market value group; coded 0 otherwise 
L-MKV = "Large" market value group, a dummy variable coded 1 if the 
IPO firm was in "Large" market value group; coded 0 otherwise 
The explanatory variables in this part followed the same definitions and 
rationales as explained in the previous section 3.3.4.1. Also, 95% confidence 
interval was used to test the statistical significance of the explanatory variables. 
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3.3.4.3 Regression of the post-listing MAAMROR I POs on year types and 
market value groups 
In this part, the MAAMROR lp0s (with closing prices on the day of listing 
as the first prices in the series) over one-year buy-and-hold, two-year buy-and-
hold and three-year buy-and-hold periods were regressed on year types and 
market value groups. The subscription rate were not included as an explanatory 
variable in this part because the MAAMROR lp0s showed the post-listing price 
performance which were not calculated based on subscription prices as the base 
line. Therefore, it was assumed that the subscription rate was not an explanatory 
variable in this part of regression. So the MAAMRORIPOs were directly regressed 
on year types and market value groups. 
The regression equation in this part was: 
MAAMRORIPOs = r o + r i Q-YR + r 2 B-YR + r 3 S-MKV + r 4 L_ 
MKV + £ (6) 
where the variables were defined in the same ways as in the previous part. 
The explanatory variables in this part again followed the same definitions 
and rationales as explained in the section 3.3.4.1. Again, 95% confidence interval 




4.1 Results of correlations: the correlations between subscription rates 
and MAAMRORSUb
1POs- classified by year and by market value 
Even if IPO firms underperform in general compared to the market index, 
those IPO firms with higher subscription rates, or more heavily 
over-subscribed IPO firms, should show relatively better price performance 
than those IPO firms with lower subscription rates. This is because if investors 
do not make systematic expectation errors in forecasting the future 
performance of IPO firms, then those IPO firms that are more over-subscribed 
should reflect a greater excess demand at the subscription price, and therefore 
a larger potential of price appreciation after their listings. 
As a result, the correlations between subscription rates and 
MAAMRORSUb
IPOs, no matter they were classified by year or by market value, 
are expected to be positive, showing that the more an IPO firm was 
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over-subscribed, the higher should be its market-adjusted returns relative to 
the IPO firms that were less over-subscribed. 
Table 2 shows the correlations between subscription rates and 
MAAMRORSUb
,POs- classified by year. The overall one-year correlation, 
two-year correlation and three-year correlation were all positive- 0.1934， 
0.0781 and 0.0995 respectively, providing evidence that IPO firms with higher 
subscription rates had relatively higher market-adjusted returns than those IPO 
firms with lower subscription rates. 
Among the three correlations, the overall one-year correlation was the 
largest- 0.1934 while the overall two-year correlation was the smallest- 0.0781. 
The same conclusion holds across the sub-periods. From the sub-periods, five 
IPO years- 1990, 1993, 1994，1996 and 1997 had one-year correlation being 
the largest among the three correlations. Only one IPO year- 1992 had 
two-year correlation being the largest. 
For the sub-samples of IPO year, all IPO years showed positive 
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correlations over the three horizons except 1991 and 1996. The one-year 
correlation and two-year correlation of 1991 was -0.0814 and 一 0 . 0 2 4 4 
respectively while the two-year correlation and three-year correlation of 1996 
was -0.0231 and -0.0221 respectively. The one-year correlation of 
1991- -0.0814 was the smallest correlation among all values. However, all 
negative correlations were relatively small in absolute values among all values 
in the sub-samples. Thus，these negative correlations were not representative 
enough to contrast the main findings and did not affect the overall correlations 
much, which were all positive. 
Among the values in the sub-samples, the two-year correlation of 1992-
0.3939 was the largest. Actually, 1992 was the IPO year which showed the 
strongest positive correlation between subscription rates and the 
MAAMRORSUb
IPOs whereas 1991 was the IPO year which showed the weakest 
positive correlation between the two. 
Table 3 shows the correlation between subscription rates and 
MAAMRORSUb
IPOs- classified by market value. Among the sub-samples of 
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market value groups, the largest correlation was the one-year correlation of 
"Medium" market value group, which was 0.2548. "Medium" market value 
group was also the group which showed the overall largest positive correlation 
between subscription rates and MAAMRORSUb丨POs, with all correlations being 
positive. 
In contrast, both "Small" and "Large" market value groups had some 
negative correlations. The one-year and two-year correlations of "Small" 
market value group were -0.0146 and -0.0073 respectively while the 
three-year correlation of "Large" market value group was -0.0375, which was 
the smallest correlation among all values of the market value sub-groups. 
However, like the situation in the IPO year sub-groups, all the three negative 
correlations of the "Small" and "Large" market value groups were not 
significantly large in absolute values to contrast the majority's positive 
correlations. Also, both "Medium" and "Large" market value groups had 
one-year correlation being the largest among the three correlations while only 
"Small" market value group had three-year correlation being the largest. 
These findings were consistent with those under IPO year sub-groups in the 
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way that subscription rates and the MAAMRORSUb
IPOs over one-year 
buy-and-hold horizon showed the largest positive correlation. 
4.2 Results of holding rates of return- MAAMRORsub
1POs 
4.2.1 MAAMRORsub
,POs over one-year, two-year and three-year 
buy-and-hold horizons- classified by year 
This part shows the market-adjusted average monthly rates of return 
received by investors who held the IPO stocks from the day of subscription to 
the one-year, two-year or three-year anniversary trading day. Table 4 shows 
that an equal-weighted portfolio of the 390 IPO firms in the sample yielded 
negative MAAMRORsub
IPOs over all horizons. The one-year, two-year and 
three-year buy-and-hold MAAMRORsub
1POs were -0.008, -0.02 and -0.0217 
respectively. The nine equal-weighted sub-portfolios of IPO firms from the 
same IPO year also yielded negative MAAMRORsub
1POs for most horizons, 
with the 1991，1994, 1997 and 1998 portfolios yielding negative 
MAAMRORSUb
IPOs for all horizons. These provided evidence that in general, 
IPO firms underperformed as compared to the market index. However, it 
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should be noted that even though there was evidence of underperformance, 
the magnitude was small because the standard deviations were large. The 
underperformance was actually statistically insignificant. 
Among the three horizons, the one-year buy-and-hold MAAMRORsub
IPOs 
from investing in the whole portfolio was significantly higher, though 
negative, than the other two horizons' MAAMRORSUb
IPOs in which the 
three-year buy-and-hold MAAMRORSUb
IP°s of the same portfolio was the 
lowest. Findings from the nine equal-weighted sub-portfolios also supported 
the phenomenon. Except the 1994 and 1998 portfolios, all sub-portfolios 
yielded the highest MAAMRORSUb丨POs over one-year buy-and-hold horizon, 
with the 1990，1992, 1993，1995 and 1996 portfolios even yielding positive 
MAAMRORSUb
IPOs. In contrast, the three-year buy-and-hold 
MAAMRORSUb
IPOs of the sub-portfolios were all negative, same for the 
two-year buy-and-hold MAAMRORSUb
1POs except the 1995 portfolio which 
showed positive two-year buy-and-hold MAAMRORSUb
IPOs. Besides, except 
the 1994 and 1997 portfolios with two-year buy-and-hold MAAMRORsub
1POs 
being the lowest as well as the 1998 portfolio with one-year buy-and-hold 
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MAAMRORSUb
IPOs being the lowest, all sub-portfolios had the three-year 
buy-and-hold MAAMRORsub
IPOs being the lowest, same as the findings from 
investing in the whole portfolio. 
The above results provided evidence that the longer the investors held the 
portfolios, the lower the rates of return in general compared to the market 
index as reflected by the overall lower three-year buy-and-hold (the longest 
horizon in this study) MAAMRORsub
1POs of the portfolios in this part. 
4.2.2 MAAMROR sub
IPOs over one-year, two-year and three-year 
buy-and-hold horizons- classified by market value 
In this part, the sub-portfolios were classified according to the market 
values. Table 5a shows the MAAMRORSUb
IP°s of the three equal-weighted 
sub-portfolios of IPO firms from the same market value group, with all IPO 
years in the sample included for classification. Among the three sub-portfolios, 
the portfolio of “Small” IPO firms yielded the lowest MAAMRORsub
IPOs over 
all horizons whereas the portfolio of "Large" IPO firms yielded the highest 
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MAAMRORsub
IPOs over all horizons, with one-year buy-and-hold 
MAAMRORsub
1POs being positive- 0.0079. 
The statistical significances of the differences in MAAMRORsub
IPOs 
among the three sub-portfolios over the three horizons were verified by the 
t-test with 95% confidence interval. Table 5b shows the results of the t-test. 
The differences between the MAAMRORsub
1POs of "Small" IPO firms and 
"Large" IPO firms over all horizons, with ‘‘Large，，IPO firms yielding higher 
market-adjusted returns, were statistically significant. The p-values of the 
t-test for their differences over one-year, two-year and three-year 
buy-and-hold horizons were 0, 0.0003 and 0.0014 respectively which were 
below the 5% significant level. For "Small" IPO firms and "Medium" IPO 
firms, the differences, with "Medium，’ IPO firms yielding relatively higher 
market-adjusted returns were also statistically significant over all except 
three-year buy-and-hold horizon. However, the differences in returns between 
"Medium" IPO firms and "Large" IPO firms, with "Large" IPO firms yielding 
higher returns, were statistically insignificant over all horizons. 
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These results showed that holding a portfolio of all "Small" IPO firms in 
the sample had poorer market-adjusted returns than holding a portfolio of all 
"Large" IPO firms in the sample as the MAAMRORSUb
IPOs over all horizons 
were lower for "Small" IPO firms. In other words, "Small" IPO firms yielded 
even lower rates of return than "Large" IPO firms. 
However, if the sample period differed, the conclusions were different. 
Table 6a to table 8b show the same kinds of information as in table 5a and 5b, 
but with different sample periods- 1990 to 1992 for table 6a and 6b, 1993 to 
1995 for table 7a and 7b and 1996 to 1998 for table 8a and 8b. 
When 1990 to 1992 was chosen as the sample period, the findings were 
on the whole consistent with those from the full sample period of 1990 to 
1998. Table 6a highlights that "Small" IPO firms yielded lower 
MAAMRORsub
IPOs over all horizons than "Large" IPO firms under the sample 
period 1990-1992. Table 6b shows that the p-values of the t-test for their 
differences were also below the 5% significant level. Comparison between 
‘‘Small，，IPO firms and "Medium" IPO firms in this sample period also 
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generated the same findings as from the full sample period. However, for 
comparison between "Medium" IPO firms and "Large" IPO firms, the 
differences, with higher MAAMRORsub
IPOs for "Large" IPO firms, were 
statistically significant over all horizons, whereas the differences of the same 
comparison under the full sample period were all statistically insignificant as 
shown in table 4b. 
The results from the 1993-1995 and 1996-1998 sub-samples confirmed 
that the differences in MAAMRORSUb
1POs among the three market value 
groups were not robust as the sample period varied. Except for the comparison 
between "Medium" and "Large" IPO firms which show consistent results with 
those under the full sample period over all horizons, the other results, in 
particular, the p-values of the t-tests for the other two comparisons under these 
two sub-periods were somehow inconsistent with those under the fiill sample 
period. 
The differences in MAAMRORsub
IPOs between "Small" IPO firms and 
"Large" IPO firms over all horizons under the 1993-1995 sub-sample and 
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1996-1998 sub-sample as shown in table 7a and table 8a respectively were 
statistically significant only for the one-year buy-and-hold horizon (p-value = 
0.0003) under the 1993-1995 sub-sample and one-year (p-value = 0,0001) as 
well as two-year buy-and-hold (p-value = 0.0441) horizons under the 
1996-1998 sub-sample as shown in table 7b and table 8b respectively. Besides, 
the differences in returns between "Small" IPO firms and "Medium" IPO 
firms under the 1993-1995 and 1996-1998 sub-samples were statistically 
significant at the 5% level only for the one-year buy-and-hold horizon, as 
contrasted with the statistical significance at the 5% level for both one-year 
and two-year buy-and-hold horizons under the full sample period. 
The result of lower MAAMRORsub
1POs of ‘‘Small，，IPO firms as compared 
to "Large" IPO firms was statistically significant at the 5% level only in the 
full sample period and the sample period 1990-1992, but not in the sample 
period 1993-1995 and 1996-1998. The statistical significances of the 
differences in MAAMRORSUb
IPOs for the other two comparisons ("Small" 
versus "Medium" IPO firms and "Medium" versus "Large" IPO firms) were 
also different according to the sample period under consideration. 
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Therefore, size effect of IPOs was not established in the Hong Kong 
stock market from the results of this study. The underperformance of "Small" 
IPO firms compared to "Large" IPO firms in Hong Kong was sensitive to the 
sample period chosen. In other words, the sample period was crucial in 
affecting the conclusions. 
4.3 The post-listing price performance of the IPO firms 
4.3.1 The post-listing price performance of the IPO firms- classified by 
year 
In this part, the MAAMROR IPOs, with closing prices on the day of listing 
as the first prices in the series, were used to show the post-listing price 
performance of the IPO firms. The method of analysis here was similar to 
those adopted in previous studies concerning the underperformance of IPO 
stocks. 
Table 9 shows that investing in an equal-weighted portfolio of the 
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390 IPO firms in the sample from their listing days yielded negative 
MAAMROR IPOs for all horizons. The one-year, two-year and three-year 
buy-and-hold MAAMROR f f0s were -0.019, -0.0254 and -0.0253 respectively. 
The nine equal-weighted sub-portfolios of IPO firms from the same IPO year 
also yielded negative MAAMROR IPOs for all horizons except the 1995 
portfolio yielding positive one-year buy-and-hold MAAMRORIPOs. These 
confirmed that on the whole, IPO firms underperformed as compared to the 
market index. 
Compared with the corresponding findings in section 4.2.1 by using 
MAAMRORSUb
IPOs, this part also showed that the first year after listing of the 
390 IPO firms showed the relatively best post-listing price performance. The 
one-year buy-and-hold MAAMROR1POs of the whole portfolio was -0.019, 
which was obviously higher than the more or less the same MAAMROR1POs 
over two-year (-0.0254) and three-year (-0.0253) buy-and-hold horizons. 
This might provide evidence to support that the poor post-listing price 
performance of the IPO firms got more serious over time. 
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However, as shown in table 9，the MAAMRORIPOs of all portfolios over 
all horizons except the 1998 portfolio were lower than the corresponding 
MAAMRORSUb
IPOs as shown in table 4. In other words, investing in an 
equal-weighted portfolio of IPO firms, be it the whole portfolio in the present 
study or any sub-portfolios of IPO year except 1998, from the day of 
subscription to the one-year, two-year or three-year anniversary trading day 
yielded relatively better market-adjusted average monthly returns than 
investing in the corresponding portfolio from the day of listing to the 
corresponding ending day. In particular, over one-year buy-and-hold horizon, 
five sub-portfolios of the IPO years- 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995 and 1996 yielded 
positive MAAMRORsub丨POs whereas for MAAMROR IPOs, only one portfolio-
the 1995 portfolio was positive. 
As MAAMROR l p0s were calculated from post-listing prices 
whereas MAAMRORsub
IPOs were calculated by using subscription prices as 
the base line, the lower MAAMROR IPOs compared with the corresponding 
MAAMRORsub丨POs simply reflected the fact that most IPO stocks in Hong 
Kong were underpriced. In other words, there was overall price appreciation 
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among the IPO firms in the sample on the day of listing, making the first day's 
closing prices higher than the subscription prices. However, the price 
appreciation in initial prices was not sustained beyond the day of listing so 
that after removing the effect of underpricing in the first day of trading, the 
subsequent MAAMRORIPOs were lower than the MAAMRORsub
IPOs for all 
portfolios over all horizons except the 1998 portfolio. 
4.3.2 The post-listing price performance of the IPO firms- classified by 
market value 
In this part, like the section 4.2.2，the sub-portfolios were classified 
according to the market values. The focus was on whether "Small" IPO firms 
had poorer post-listing price performance in general than "Large" IPO firms 
as reflected by the MAAMRORsub丨POs in section 4.2.2 and whether the 
differences were statistically significant at the 5% level across all sample 
periods. 
Table 10a shows the post-listing price performance of the three 
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equal-weighted sub-portfolios of IPO firms from the same market value group, 
with the full sample period used. All three portfolios yielded negative 
MAAMRORIPOs over all horizons. Among the three sub-groups, again 
“Small” IPO firms had poorer post-listing price performance than "Medium" 
and "Large" IPO firms over all horizons. 
From the t-test with 95% confidence interval，table 10b shows that the 
poorer post-listing price performance of “Small” IPO firms as compared to 
"Large" IPO firms was statistically significant over all horizons. The p-values 
for the differences over one-year, two-year and three-year buy-and-hold 
horizons were 0，0.209 and 0.046 respectively, which were below the 5% 
significant level. These results were consistent with those of table 5b under 
section 4.2.2 which shows MAAMRORSUb
IPOs. For the other two comparisons, 
only the difference between “Small’，and "Medium" IPO firms over one-year 
buy-and-hold horizon was statistically significant (p-value = 0.0004). 
However, as in section 4.2.2，if the sample period differed, the 
conclusions were different. Table 11a to table 13b show the same kinds of 
55 
information as in table 10a and 10b, but with different sample periods- 1990 
to 1992 for table 11a and l ib, 1993 to 1995 for table 12a and 12b and 1996 to 
1998 for table 13a and 13b. 
When 1990 to 1992 was chosen as the sample period, the differences in 
post-listing price performance among the three market value groups were 
consistent with those under the full sample period in the way that "Small" IPO 
firms had the poorest post-listing price performance while "Large" IPO firms 
had the relatively best poor post-listing price performance, with one-year 
buy-and-hold horizon even yielding positive MAAMRORIPOs (0.0093) as 
shown in table 11a. However, the statistical significances of the differences in 
MAAMROR丨POs were consistent with those under the full sample period only 
for the comparison between "Small" and "Large" IPO firms. From table l ib, 
the differences in MAAMROR IPOs between "Small" and "Medium" IPO firms 
were both significant at the 5% level over one-year buy-and-hold (p-value = 
0.0099) and two-year buy-and-hold (p-value = 0.0283) horizons whereas 
under the full sample period, only the differences over one-year buy-and-hold 
horizon was statistically significant at the 5% level as shown in table 10b. 
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Besides, the differences in MAAMRORIPOs between “Medium，，and "Large" 
IPO firms, which were all statistically insignificant under the fiill sample, 
were statistically significant over two-year (p-value = 0.0204) and three-year 
(p-value = 0.0037) buy-and-hold horizons under the sample period 
1990-1992. 
The results from the 1993-1995 and 1996-1998 sub-samples confirmed 
that the differences in post-listing price performance among the three market 
value groups depended on how the sample period was defined. One important 
finding was that the consistently poorer post-listing price performance of 
"Small" IPO firms as compared to "Large" IPO firms under the full sample 
period and the 1990-1992 sub-samples was no longer valid under the 
1993-1995 and 1996-1998 sub-samples. 
Table 12a shows that under the 1993-1995 sub-sample, the poorer 
post-listing price performance of "Small" IPO firms as compared to "Large" 
IPO firms existed only over one-year buy-and-hold horizon. Over two-year 
and three-year buy-and-hold horizons, the reverse was found, with "Large" 
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IPO firms having poorer post-listing price performance than "Small" IPO 
firms. Actually "Small" IPO firms showed the relatively best post-listing price 
performance over two-year and three-year buy-and-hold horizons under this 
sub-sample. Yet the differences were only statistically significant at the 5% 
level for the one-year buy-and-hold horizon (p-value = 0.0231) as shown by 
the p-values in table 12b. 
Table 13a shows the post-listing price performance of the three groups 
under the 1996-1998 sub-sample. The differences in post-listing price 
performance between "Small" IPO firms and "Large" IPO firms were 
statistically significant at the 5% level only over the one-year buy-and-hold 
horizon (p-value = 0.0046). Indeed, as shown in table 13b，the differences in 
post-listing price performance among the three groups were all statistically 
insignificant except the difference between "Small" and "Large" IPO firms 
over one-year buy-and-hold horizon. Besides, the poorest post-listing price 
performance of "Small" IPO firms existed over one-year and two-year 
buy-and-hold horizons only while "Medium" IPO firms showed the poorest 
post-listing price performance over three-year buy-and-hold horizon. 
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As a result, same as the conclusions in section 4.2.2, the poorer 
post-listing price performance of "Small" IPO firms as compared to "Large" 
IPO firms was statistically significant at the 5% level only in the full sample 
period and the sample period 1990-1992，but not in the sample period 
1993-1996 and 1996-1998. In this part, it was found that "Small" IPO firms 
could perform better than "Large" IPO firms under the 1993-95 sub-sample. 
Besides, the post-listing price performance between "Small" and "Medium" 
IPO firms and the statistical significances for their differences at the 5% level 
over the three horizons also varied with the sample period. 
4.4 Regression results 
Tables 14a to 14c show the OLS regression results of the one-year, 
IPOs • t 
two-year and three-year buy-and-hold MAAMRORsub respectively on 
subscription rate, year types and market value groups. 
As expected, the coefficient of subscription rate was positive, in the 
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one-year, two-year and three-year buy-and-hold MAAMRORSUb
IPOs 
regressions. Also, all coefficients were significant at the 5% level with the 
one-year buy-and-hold horizon being the most significant (p-values = 0, 0.004 
and 0.006 for one-year, two-year and three-year buy-and-hold horizons 
respectively). Therefore, other things being equal, IPO firms with higher 
subscription rates yielded higher MAAMRORsub
IPOs over all time horizons. 
For year types, it was consistently found that the IPO firms in "Busy" 
years yielded lower MAAMRORsub
1POs than IPO firms in "Moderate" years 
(the base case), other things being equal. This was shown by the negative 
coefficients of the dummy variable B-YR over all time horizons. All 
coefficients were significant at the 5% level (p-values = 0.002, 0.001 and 
0.001 for one-year, two-year and three-year buy-and-hold horizons 
respectively). This provided evidence that other things being equal, years with 
huge amount of IPO activities tended to have more stocks of poor quality 
listed. However, "Quiet" and "Moderate" years did not have obvious 
difference as shown from the regression results. The coefficient of "Quiet" 
years was positive only over two-year buy-and-hold horizon (0.0061). Over 
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one-year and three-year buy-and-hold horizons, the coefficient was -0.0007 
and -0.0034 respectively. Yet all coefficients were insignificant at the 5% 
level. 
For market value groups, the coefficient of "Small" market value group 
was negative over all horizons, showing that other things being equal, "Small" 
IPO firms yielded lower MAAMRORsub
IPOs than "Medium" IPO firms (the 
base case). However, the coefficients were significant at the 5% level only for 
the one-year (p-value = 0) and two-year (p-value = 0.014) buy-and-hold 
horizons. For "Large" market value group, the coefficient was positive over 
all horizons, showing that other things being equal, "Large" IPO firms yielded 
higher MAAMRORsub
IPOs than "Medium" IPO firms. However, these 
coefficients were not significant at the 5% level. As a result, the argument that 
"Small" IPO firms yielded lower market-adjusted returns than "Large" IPO 
firms could not be firmly established from these regression results. 
Tables 15a to 15c show the regression results of the one-year, two-year 
and three-year buy-and-hold MAAMROR lp0s respectively on subscription rate， 
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year types and market value groups. 
In contrast with the results in tables 14a to 14c, subscription rate did not 
play an important role in affecting the MAAMRORIPOs, i.e. the post-listing 
price performance. The coefficients of subscription rate were insignificant 
over all horizons and the sign was even opposite to expectation- being 
negative over all horizons. As a result, it was found that subscription rate did 
not explain well the price performance of the 390 IPO firms in the sample 
after the first day of trading. One possible reason was that subscription rate 
was fully captured by the market price on the first day of trading once the 
IPOs were listed. 
For year types, the results for "Busy" year were consistent with those in 
tables 14a to 14c. The negative coefficients of "Busy" year over one-year, 
two-year and three-year buy-and-hold horizons were all significant at the 5% 
level (p-value = 0.001). It was also the only explanatory variable with its 
coefficient significant at the 5% level over two-year and three-year 
buy-and-hold horizons. As a result, it was obviously shown that other things 
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being equal, IPO firms which were listed in years with more IPO activities 
had poorer post-listing price performance in general. In other words, IPO 
years with more IPO activities consisted of more IPO firms of poorer quality, 
same as the conclusion drawn from tables 14a to 14c. 
For the variables "Quiet" year, "Small" market value group and "Large" 
market value group, the findings were similar to those under tables 14a to 14c. 
It was still hard to draw a clear conclusion for the effect of "Quiet" year on the 
post-listing price performance. The coefficient was negative over one-year 
(-0.0096) and three-year (-0.0063) buy-and-hold horizons but positive over 
two-year buy-and-hold horizon (0.0017) and these coefficients were again 
insignificant at the 5% level. 
The coefficients of "Small" and "Large" market value groups were 
in the same sign as those under tables 14a to 14c respectively. Also, the 
coefficients were insignificant at the 5% level except that of ‘‘Small” market 
value group over one-year buy-and-hold horizon (p-value 二 0). As a result, the 
argument that "Small" IPO firms yielded lower market-adjusted returns than 
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“Large，，IPO firms also could not be firmly established from these regression 
results of post-listing price performance. 
Tables 16a to 16c show the regression results of the one-year, two-year 
and three-year buy-and-hold MAAMRORIPOs respectively on year types and 
market value groups. The findings were the same as those in tables 15a to 15c 




The first focus of this study is to investigate the correlation between 
subscription rates and market-adjusted average monthly returns (with 
subscription prices as the base line) of the 390 IPOs listed on the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong during the period 1990 to 1998. The overall positive correlations 
over all horizons (one-year, two-year and three-year buy-and-hold) and the 
positive coefficients of the OLS regression results provided evidence that 
investors are rational in the sense that in general, they have not made systematic 
expectation errors in forecasting the future performance of the IPO firms. If a 
higher subscription rate can reflect that investors are more optimistic about the 
future performance of the stock, the positive correlations do suggest that investors 
are rational in their expectations. Also, those IPO firms that are more over-
subscribed reflect a greater excess demand at the subscription price. Therefore, 
there is a larger potential of price appreciation after their listings. The positive 
correlations supported this assertion. 
The second focus of this study is the stock price performance and in 
particular, the post-listing price performance of the IPOs- Results of calculating 
the MAAMRORsub
IPOs and MAAMRORIPOs both showed negative returns over all 
horizons for an equal-weighted portfolio of the 390 IPO stocks under this study. 
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Therefore, IPOs underperformed as compared to the market index in general. 
This finding is consistent with those from previous studies. Among the three 
horizons, the one-year buy-and-hold horizon yielded the highest average returns 
for an equal-weighted portfolio of the 390 IPO stocks under this study. This is 
also true for most sub-portfolios of years and market value groups. Some sub-
samples of years even yielded positive MAAMRORsub
1POs over one-year buy-and-
hold horizon. In contrast, the three-year buy-and-hold horizon, which was the 
longest duration of investing in the IPOs in this study, yielded the lowest average 
returns in general. This showed that the longer the investors held the portfolios, 
the lower the rates of return in general compared to the market index and thus 
confirmed the poor long-run price performance of IPOs once again. Besides, the 
relatively higher values of MAAMRORsub
1POs compared to the corresponding 
MAAMROR,POs for the portfolios over the three horizons in general reflected that 
most IPO stocks in Hong Kong were underpriced. After removing the effect of 
underpricing in the first day of trading, the subsequent MAAMRORIPOs were 
lower than the MAAMRORsub
IP°s for most sub-portfolios of year and market 
value groups. 
The third focus of this study is to investigate whether "Small" IPO stocks 
performed poorer than "Large" IPO stocks and whether the phenomenon was 
consistent across all sample periods. To answer the first question, the 390 IPOs in 
the sample were sub-divided into three sub-samples of market value groups-
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Small, Medium and Large. Then the MAAMRORsub
IPOs and MAAMRORIPOs of 
each group over the three horizons were calculated. The argument that IPOs tend 
to be small growth stocks and they are the ones which consistently generate the 
poorest performance received support only for the whole sample period 1990-
1998 and the sample period 1990-1993 under this study. The argument could not 
be reliably established in the sample periods 1993-1995 and 1996-1998， 
especially for the post-listing price performance (MAAMRORlp0s) of the IPOs. 
The results showed that the poorer post-listing price performance of 
"Small" IPOs as compared to "Large" IPOs was reliably established only in the 
full sample period 1990-1998 and the sub-sample 1990-1992 as the p-values of 
the t-test were all significant at the 5% level. However, the argument received no 
concrete support from the sample periods 1993-1995 and 1996-1998 because the 
p-values of the t-test were significant at the 5% level only over one-year buy-and-
hold horizon. From the sample period 1993-1995, it was even found that "Small" 
IPOs had better post-listing price performance than "Large" IPOs over two-year 
and three-year buy-and-hold horizons, though the p-values were not statistically 
significant. Overall, "Small" IPOs performed poorer than "Large" IPOs only 
over one-year buy-and-hold horizon. From the second year onwards, there was no 
definite superior performance of "Large" IPOs over "Small" IPOs, depending on 
the sample period chosen for investigation. 
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Therefore, as pointed out by Ritter and Welch (2002), the results of stock 
price performance are sensitive to the sample period chosen. Depending on 
whether and how one includes some sample periods, one can probably come to 
rather different conclusions. Like the present study, the sample period was 
responsible for some of the conclusions. Also, it implied that the long-run 
performance of IPOs varied over time. So one should be cautious in examining 
the sample periods when comparing studies. 
Indeed, the OLS regression results also provided evidence that sample 
period was critical in affecting the stock price performance. In the regressions, the 
effect of sample period was determined through the number of IPOs listed in the 
IPO years. It is commonly believed that in years of huge IPO activities, there tend 
to be more stocks of poorer quality because some opportunistic firms try to make 
use of positive market sentiments to go public. Therefore, IPOs listed in years of 
more IPO activities tend to show poorer price performance. From the regression 
results, the negative coefficients of the explanatory dummy variable- "Busy" year 
were statistically significant at 5% level over all horizons for both 
MAAMRORSUb
IPOs and MAAMROR1POs and this strongly supported the above 
argument. In contrast, concerning the effect of market value on the price 
performance of IPOs, the positive and negative coefficients of the dummy 
variables "Large" market value group and "Small" market value group 
respectively under the regression of MAAMRORIPOs were all statistically 
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insignificant at the 5% level except that of "Small" market value group over one-
year buy-and-hold horizon. As a result, the argument that "Small" IPOs yielded 
poorer post-listing returns as compared to "Large" IPOs could not be firmly 
established from these regression results under this study. In other words, size 
effect of the IPO firms could not be established in the Hong Kong stock market. 
According to the findings of the present study, one can merely conclude that 
"Small" IPOs performed poorer than "Large" IPOs over one-year buy-and-hold 
horizon. The situation was not persistent from the second year of post-listing 




To conclude, this study has focused on three areas concerning the stock 
price performance of IPOs. The first focus is the correlations between 
subscription rates and market-adjusted average monthly returns (with 
subscription prices as the base line) of the 390 IPOs listed on the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong during the period 1990 to 1998. The results from directly 
calculating the correlations and OLS regressions both showed the positive effect 
of subscription rates on stock price performance in general. It was significant that 
the higher the subscription rates of the IPOs, the higher the market-adjusted 
average monthly returns. This provided evidence that investors are rational in the 
sense that they have not made systematic expectation errors in predicting the 
future performance of the IPO stocks. 
The second focus is the stock price performance and in particular, the 
post-listing price performance of the IPOs. The overall negative market-adjusted 
average monthly rates of return with subscription prices as the base line and with 
the closing prices on the day of listing as the base line both showed that IPOs 
underperformed as compared to the market index (HSI). However, it should be 
noted that even though there was evidence of underperformance, the magnitude 
was small because the standard deviations were large. The underperformance was 
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actually statistically insignificant. 
For comparison among the three horizons in this study, the poorest price 
performance was mainly in the three-year buy-and-hold horizon whereas one-
year buy-and-hold horizon yielded the highest returns in general. As a result, it 
could be concluded that the longer the investors held the portfolios, the lower the 
rates of return in general as compared to the market index and thus confirmed the 
poor long-run price performance of IPOs. Besides, the generally lower 
MAAMRORIPOs compared to the MAAMRORsub
IPOs provided evidence that 
underpricing occurred on the first day of trading among the IPOs in Hong Kong. 
The third focus of this study is to investigate whether "Small" IPOs 
performed poorer than "Large" IPOs and whether the variation in sample period 
affected the findings. Results from the full sample period showed that "Small" 
IPOs did generate lower returns than "Large" IPOs over all horizons. However, 
when the sample period varied, the persistently poorer price performance of 
"Small" IPOs over "Large" IPOs was not reliably established. OLS regression 
results for post-listing price performance also showed that the negative and 
positive coefficients of the dummy explanatory variables "Small" and "Large" 
market value groups respectively were all statistically insignificant at the 5% 
level except that of "Small" market value group over one-year buy-and-hold 
horizon. As a result, there was no definite superior performance of "Large" IPOs 
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over "Small" IPOs as found in this study. The conclusion depended on the sample 
period chosen for investigation. Moreover, the negative coefficients of the 
dummy explanatory variable "Busy" year in the regression models which was 
statistically significant at 5% level over all horizons showed that in years of huge 
IPO activities, there tend to be more stocks of poorer quality because some 
opportunistic firms try to make use of positive market sentiments to go public. 
This result is consistent with those from the US studies, showing that "peak 
timing" is a major factor in explaining the poor price performance of IPO stocks. 
The findings also provided evidence that sample period was critical in affecting 
the price performance of IPOs. Therefore, one should be cautious about the 
sample periods when comparing studies because the sample period may be 
responsible for some of the conclusions. 
This study only investigated the IPOs listed in Hong Kong. In order to 
seek more support for the argument that sample period is critical in affecting the 
performance of IPOs and in order to have an in-depth study of which sub-samples 
of years are particularly prone to poor post-listing price performance, IPOs listed 
in other financial markets like Japan, Singapore and Taiwan etc should be 
investigated. 
Beside, due to the ambiguity in identifying matching firms and much 
heterogeneity among firms even within the same sector, the frequently adopted 
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matching firm approach in assessing the stock price performance was not adopted 
in this study. Of course a more thorough investigation can be achieved if style-
adjusted returns are also calculated for the IPO firms. Moreover, this study only 
covered the three years of post-IPO period. It is possible that a rebound of 
performance can be seen after a longer time study. Thus, extending the time 
horizon of this study might get some interesting results. 
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Table 1 
The number of IPO firms in Hong Kong from 1990 to 1998 that were 
included in this study 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 19¾ 1995 1996 1997 1998 
No. of IPOs 10 I 48 1 51 I 60 I 48 I 24 I 44 I 77 I 28 
Table 2 
Correlation between subscription rates and MAAMRORsub
IPOs -classified by 
year 
Year No. of IPOs 1-year Correlation 2-year Correlation 3-year Correlation 
1990 “ 10 0.3050 0.1094 0.0065 
1991 48 -0.0814 -0.0244 0.019 “ 
1992 ‘ 51 0.3560 0.3939 0.2874 “ 
1993 ‘ 60 0.2982 0.1865 0.2179 “ 
1994— 48 "“ 0.1676 0.0516 0.0764 
1995 24 0.0524 0.1669 — 0.3704 
1996 44 0,1006 -0.0231 一 -0.0221 
1997 77 “ 0.2652 0.1481 0.0844 
1998 28 0.0006 0.0280 0.1586 “ 
All 390 0.1934 0.0781 0.0995 
Table 3 
Correlation between subscription rates and MAAMRORsub
IPOs -classified by 
market value 
Market value group No. of IPOs 1-year Correlation 2-year Correlation 3-year Correlation 
Small "" 133 — -0.0146 -0.0073 0.0969 
Medium 144 — 0.2548 0.1362 0.1884 
Large — 113 " " “ 0.1843 0.0306 -0.0375 




IPOs over the three buy-and-hold horizons- classified by year 
Year No. of IPOs 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
• 1990 10 0.0051 -0.0145 ""“-0.0175 
(0.0434) (0.0245) (0.0167) 
1991 48 -0.0071 -0.0137 — -0.0216 
(0.0269) (0.0246) (0.0198) 
‘1992 51 0.0000 -0.0238 ~-0.0263 
(0.0366) (0.0284) (0.0214) 
1993 60 0.0046 ~-0.0145 ~ -0.0175 
(0.0544) (0.0347) (0.0279) 
“1994 48 -0.0106 -0.0124 ~-0.0058 
(0.0440) (0.0301) (0.0228) 
‘1995 24 0.0104 0.0006 ~-0.0255 
(0.0487) (0.0398) (0.0295) 
1996 44 0.0127 ""“-0.0219 — -0.0252 
(0.0445) (0.0323) (0.0259) 
1997 77 ”"“-0.0258 -0.0324 — -0.0271 
(0.0489) (0.0305) (0.0225) 
• 1998 28 -0.0502 -0.0313 -0.0273 
(0.0645) (0.0472) (0.0324) 
All 390 -0.0080 ~"q.0200 ~-0.0217 
(0.0490) (0.0334) (0.0253) 




IPOs of the IPOs under full sample period over the three buy-
and-hold horizons- classified by market value 
Market value group No. of IPOs 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
Small (S) 133 :0.0275 —"-0.0282 —-0.0260 
(0.0381) (0.0337) (0.0236) 
Medium (M) — 144 -0.0023 -0.0181 -0.0220 
(0.0531) (0.0332) (0.0265) 
Large (L) 113 0.0079 -0.0129 ~-0.0161 
(0.0477) (0.0315) (0.0247) 
All 一 390 — -0.0080 -0.0200 -0.0217 
(0.0490) (0.0334) (0.0253) 
-Standard deviations are in parentheses 
Table 5b 
P-values of the t-test for the differences in MAAMRORsub
I ,>0s among the 
market value groups under full sample period 
Comparison 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
S versus M 0* 0.0131* 0.1840 
" s ^ u s l T 0* 0.0003* 0.0014* 
~M versus L 0.1058 0.1966 0.0633 




IP°8 of the IPOs under the sample period 1990-1992 over the 
three buy-and-hold horizons- classified by market value 
Market value group No. of IPOs 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
Small “ 45 ~ -0.0161 -0.0287 -0.0306 — 
(0.0252) (0.0233) (0.0164) 
Medium 46 " “ 0.0002 -0.0169 一 -0.0236 
(0.0332) (0.0266) (0.0210) 
Large 18 一 0.0235 0.0028 “ -0.0053 
(0.0356) (0.0220) (0.0167) 
All — 109 ""“"0.0026 -0.0185 ~-0.0234 
(0.0333) (0.0267) (0.0204) 
-Standard deviations are in parentheses 
Table 6b 
P-values of the t-test for the differences in MAAMRORsub
IPOs among the 
market value groups under the sample period 1990-1992 
Comparison 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
S versus M 0.0099* “ 0.0267* 0.0806 
S versus L 0.0002* 一 0* 一 0* 
"M versus L 0.0232* 0.0044* 0.0008* 




IPOs of the IPOs under the sample period 1993-1995 over the 
three buy-and-hold horizons- classified by market value 
Market value group No. of IPOs 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
Small “ 31 -0.0236 一 -0.0138 “ -0.0139 
(0.0343) (0.0363) (0.0217) 
Medium 57 “ 0.0043 -0.0116 -0.0172 一 
(0.0565) (0.0344) (0.0308) 
Large 44 “ 0.0114 -0.0083 -0.0121 一 
(0,0460) (0.0333) (0.0262) 
All 132 “ 0.0001 -0.0110 -0.0147 
(0.0501) (0.0343) (0.0273) 
-Standard deviations are in parentheses 
Table 7b 
P-values of the t-test for the differences in MAAMRORsub丨POs among the 
market value groups under the sample period 1993-1995 
Comparison 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
S versus M 0.005* 0.7803 0.5597 
‘S versus L 0.0003* 0.5038 0.7499 一 
'M versus LI 0.4873 0.6267 0.3729 “ 




IPOs of the IPOs under the sample period 1996-1998 over the 
three buy-and-hold horizons- classified by market value 
Market value group No. of IPOs 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
Small 57 “ -0.0387 “ -0.0355 -0.0291 — 
(0.0452) (0.0370) (0.0272) 
Medium 41 -0.0145 -0.0286 -0.0271 一 
(0.0643) (0.0362) (0.0249) 
Large 51 -0.0006 -0.0224 -0.0233 
(0.0518) (0.0300) (0.0240) 
Ml 149 -0.0190 -0.0291 -0.0266 
(0.0554) (0.0348) (0.0255) 
-Standard deviations are in parentheses 
Table 8b 
P-values of the t-test for the differences in MAAMRORsub
1POs among the 
market value groups under the sample period 1996-1998 
Comparison 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
S versus M 0.0418* 0.3539 0.7037 “ 
S versus L ' 0.0001* “ 0.0441* 0.2394""“ 
M versus L 丨 0.2684 0.3836 0.4610 一 
-* : significant at 5% level 
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Table 9 
The post-listing price performance (MAAMROR IPOs) of the IPOs - classified 
by year 
Year No. of IPOs 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
1990 10 -0.0078 “ -0.0207 -0.0216 
(0.0302) (0.0232) (0.0169) 
1991 — 48 —-0.0126 — -0.0165 “ -0.0234 
(0.0299) (0.0266) (0.0208) 
1992 51 -0.0108 -0.0291 ~"o.Q298 
(0.0334) (0.0255) (0.0198) 
1993 60 -0.0234 ~^).0280 ~-0.0266 
(0.0358) (0.0295) (0.0241) 
1994 48 -0.0115 -0.0129 -0.0061 
(0.0423) (0.0299) (0.0227) 
1995 — 24 0.0090 -0.0001 " -0.0260 一 
(0.0481) (0.0389) (0.0294) 
1996 44 ""“-0.0009 -0.0284 ~ -0.0295 
(0.0410) (0.0328) (0.0265) 
“1997 77 -0.0397 "“-0.0394 一 -0.0318 
(0.0457) (0.0319) (0.0236) 
1998 28 -0.0479 ""“-0.0302 ~-0.0265 
(0.0639) (0.0457) (0.0313) 
All 390 -0.0190 -0.0254 -0.0253 
(0.0442) (0.0330) (0.0250) 
-Standard deviations are in parentheses 
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Table 10a 
The post-listing price performance of the IPOs under full sample period-
classified by market value 
Market value group No. of IPOs 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
Small 133 -0.0327 -0.0308 -0.0278 
(0.0392) (0.0341) (0.0239) 
Medium — 144 -0.0147 -0.0241 -0.0261 
(0.0449) (0.0309) (0.0246) 
Large — 113 ""“-0.0083 ~-0.0208 —-0.0213 
(0.0452) (0.0336) (0.0265) 
All “ 390 ~ -0.0190 — -0.0254 — -0.0253 
(0.0442) (0.0330) (0.0250) 
-Standard deviations are in parentheses 
Table 10b 
P-values of the t-test for the differences in post-listing price performance 
among the market value groups under full sample period 
Comparison 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
~S versus M 一 0.0004* 0.0893 0.5412 
"S versus L 0* 0.0209* 0.046* 
"M versus L 0.2589 0,4080 0.1447 
-* : significant at 5% level 
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Table 11a 
The post-listing price performance of the IPOs under the sample period 
1990-1992- classified by market value 
Market value group No. of IPOs 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
Small 45 -0.0233 -0.0323 一 -0.0329 
(0.0227) (0.0232) (0.0162) 
Medium 46 -0.0076 -0.0208 -0,0261 
(0.0332) (0.0260) (0.0209) 
Large 18 ~ 0.0093 -0.0041 -0.0098 
(0.0337) (0.0242) (0.0181) 
All — 109 -0.0113 —-0.0228 -0.0262 
(0.0314) (0.0263) (0.0201) 
-Standard deviations are in parentheses 
Table l ib 
P-values of the t-test for the differences in post-listing price performance 
among the market value groups under the sample period 1990-1992 
Comparison 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
S versus M 0.0099* 0.0283* 0.0849 
一 S versus L — 0.001* 0.0002* “ 0.0001* 
一 M versus L 0.0804 0.0204* 0.0037* 
-* : significant at 5% level 
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Table 12a 
The post-listing price performance of the IPOs under the sample period 
1993-1995- classified by market value 
Market value group No. of IPOs 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
Small — 31 -0.0277 —-0.0159 -0.0152 
(0.0340) (0.0362) (0.0226) 
Medium — 57 -0.0108 —-0.0189 -0.0220 
(0.0411) (0.0294) (0.0269) 
Large 44 “ -0.0061 -0.0168 “ -0.0178 ~ 
(0.0465) (0.0357) (0.0281) 
All 一 132 "“"^0.0132 -0.0175 -0.0190 
(0.0420) (0.0330) (0.0264) 
-Standard deviations are in parentheses 
Table 12b 
P-values of the t-test for the differences in post-listing price performance 
among the market value groups under the sample period 1993-1995 
Comparison 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
S versus M 0,043* 0.6975 0.2139 
S versus L 0.0231* 0.9165 0.6666 ~ 
一 M versus L I 0.5951 0.7552 0.4458 
-* : significant at 5% level 
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Table 13a 
The post-listing price performance of the IPOs under the sample period 
1996-1998- classified by market value 
Market value group No. of IPOs 1-year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
Small 57 -0.0430 -0.0378 -0.0307 “ 
(0.0490) (0.0380) (0.0273) 
Medium 41 -0.0280 -0.0352 一 -0.0316 
(0.0579) (0.0354) (0.0244) 
Large 51 “ -0.0164 -0.0301 -0.0285 “ 
(0.0462) (0.0321) (0.0260) 
All 149 ~ -0.0298 _ -0.0344 一 -0.0302 
(0.0516) (0.0353) (0.0259) 
-Standard deviations are in parentheses 
Table 13b 
P-values of the t-test for the differences in post-listing price performance 
among the market value groups under the sample period 1996-1998 
Comparison 1 -year holding 2-year holding 3-year holding 
S versus M 0.1839 0.7330 “ 0.8602 
S versus L 0.0046* 0.2570""“ 0.6688 
M versus L 0.2982 0.4730 0.5544 一 




IPOs versus SUB, Q-YR, B-YR, S-MKV and L-MKV 
The regress ion equat ion i s : 
1-year MAAMRORsub
1POs = - 0.0136 + 0.0069 SUB - 0.0007 Q-YR -
0.0164 B-YR - 0.0230 S-MKV + 0.0095 L-MKV 
Pred ic tor Coe f f i c i en t T-s t a t i s t i c s P-value 
Constant -0.0136* -2.35 0.019 
SUB 0.0069* 5.08 0.000 
Q-YR -0.0007 -0.09 0.926 
B-YR -0.0164* -3.08 0.002 
S-MKV -0.0230* -4.21 0.000 
L-MKV 0.0095 1.66 0.097 
R2 = 15.4% 
• - s i g n i f i c a n t a t 5% l eve l 
Ana lys is of Variance 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Regression 5 0.143968 0.028794 14.01 0.00 
Res idua l Error 384 0.789355 0.002056 
Tota l 389 0.933323 
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Table 14a 
1-year MAAMRORsub IPOs versus SUB, Q-YR, B-YR, S-MKV and L-MKV 
The regression equation is: 
2-year MAAMRORsub
IPOs = - 0.0210 + 0.0028 SUB + 0.0061 Q-YR - 0.0125 B-
YR - 0.0096 S-MKV + 0.0063 L-MKV 
Predictor Coefficient T-statistics P-value 
Constant -0.0210* -5.12 0.000 
SUB 0.0028* 2.86 0.004 
Q-YR 0.0061 1.18 0.241 
B-YR -0.0125* -3.29 0.001 
S-MKV - 0 . 0 0 9 6 * -2.47 0.014 
L-MKV 0.0063 1.54 0.124 
R2 = 7.6% 
* - s i g n i f i c a n t a t 5% leve l 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Regression 5 0.033081 0.006616 6.35 0.000 
Res idua l Error 384 0.400095 0.001042 
Tota l 389 0.433176 
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Table 14a 
1-year MAAMRORsub IPOs versus SUB, Q-YR, B-YR, S-MKV and L-MKV 
The regression equat ion i s : 
3-year MAAMRORsub
IPOs = - 0.0228 + 0.0020 SUB - 0.0034 Q-YR -
0.0096 B-YR - 0.0032 S-MKV + 0.0062 L-MKV 
Predictor Coefficient T-statistics P-value 
Constant -0.0228* -7.28 0.000 
SUB 0.0020* 2.79 0.006 
Q-YR -0.0034 -0.87 0.383 
B-YR -0.0096* -3.30 0.001 
S-MKV -0.0032 -1.07 0.286 
L-MKV 0.0062 1.92 0.055 
R2 = 6.1% 
* 一 s i g n i f i c a n t a t 5% l eve l 
Ana lys is of Variance 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Regression 5 0.0151275 0.0030255 4.98 0.000 
Res idua l Error 384 0.2330793 0.0006070 




IPOs versus SUB, Q-YR, B-YR, S-MKV and L-MKV 
The regression equat ion i s : 
1-year MAAMRORIPOs= - 0.0006 - 0.0019 SUB - 0.0096 Q-YR -
0.0167 B-YR - 0.0182 S-MKV + 0.0088 L-MKV 
Predictor Coefficient T-statistics P-value 
Constant -0.0006 -0.11 0.911 
SUB -0.0019 -1.50 0.135 
Q-YR -0.0096 -1.42 0.157 
B-YR -0.0167* -3.37 0.001 
S-MKV -0.0182* -3.56 0.000 
L-MKV 0.0088 1.64 0.102 
R2 = 9.8% 
* - s i g n i f i c a n t a t 5% leve l 
Ana lys is of Variance 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Regression 5 0.074254 0.014851 8.32 0.000 
Res idua l Error 384 0.685794 0.001786 
Tota l 389 0.760048 
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Table 14a 
1-year MAAMRORsubIPOs versus SUB, Q-YR, B-YR, S-MKV and L-MKV 
The regression equat ion i s : 
2-year MAAMRORIPOs = - 0.0145 - 0.0016 SUB + 0.0017 Q-YR -
0.0127 B-YR - 0.0074 S-MKV + 0.0059 L-MKV 
Pred ic tor Coe f f i c i en t T-s t a t i s t i c s P-value 
Constant -0.0145* -3.58 0.000 
SUB -0.0016 -1.65 0.100 
Q-YR 0.0017 0.33 0.745 
B-YR -0.0127* -3.38 0.001 
S-MKV -0.0074 -1.93 0.055 
L-MKV 0.0059 1.47 0.142 
R2 = 7.9% 
• - s i g n i f i c a n t a t 5% l eve l 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Regression 5 0.033526 0.006705 6.62 0.000 
Res idua l Error 384 0.389170 0.001013 
Tota l 389 0.422696 
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Table 14a 
1-year MAAMRORsubIPOs versus SUB, Q-YR, B-YR, S-MKV and L-MKV 
The regression equat ion i s : 
3-year MAAMROR,POs= - 0.0184 - 0.0009 SUB - 0.0063 Q-YR -
0.0097 B-YR - 0.0017 S-MKV + 0.0059 L-MKV 
Predictor Coefficient T-statistics P-value 
Constant -0.0184* -5.91 0.000 
SUB -0.0009 -1.17 0.243 
Q-YR - 0 . 0 0 6 3 - 1 . 6 2 0 . 1 0 6 
B-YR -0.0097* -3.36 0.001 
S-MKV -0.0017 -0.58 0.561 
L-MKV 0.0059 1.91 0.056 
R2 = 5.2% 
* - s i g n i f i c a n t a t 5% l eve l 
Ana lys is of Variance 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Regression 5 0.0127010 0.0025402 4.23 0.001 
Res idua l Error 384 0.2303393 0.0005998 
Tota l 389 0.2430402 
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Table 14a 
1-year MAAMRORsubIPOs versus SUB, Q-YR, B-YR, S-MKV and L-MKV 
The reg ress i on equa t i on i s : 
1-year MAAMRORIPOs = - 0.0051 - 0.0069 Q-YR - 0.0190 B-YR -
0.0178 S-MKV + 0.0085 L-MKV 
Predictor Coefficient T-statistics P-value 
Constant -0.0051 -1.16 0.247 
Q-YR -0.0069 -1.06 0.290 
B-YR -0.0190* -4.01 0.000 
S-MKV -0.0178* -3.48 0.001 
L-MKV 0.0085 1.59 0.113 
R2 = 9.2% 
* - s i g n i f i c a n t a t 5% l e v e l 
A n a l y s i s of Var iance 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Regress ion 4 0.070252 0.017563 9.80 0.000 
Re s i d u a l Er ror 385 0.689796 0.001792 
To t a l 389 0.760048 
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Table 14a 
1-year MAAMRORsubIPOs versus SUB, Q-YR, B-YR, S-MKV and L-MKV 
The regress ion equat ion i s : 
2-year MAAMRORlp0s = - 0.0183 + 0.0039 Q-YR - 0.0145 B-YR -
0.0071 S-MKV + 0.0057 L-MKV 
Predictor Coefficient T-statistics P-value 
Constant -0.0183* -5.46 0.000 
Q-YR 0 . 0 0 3 9 0 . 7 9 0 . 4 3 1 
B-YR -0.0145* -4.07 0.000 
S-MKV -0.0071 -1.83 0.067 
L-MKV 0.0057 1.41 0.158 
R2 = 7.3% 
* - s i g n i f i c a n t a t 5% leve l 
Ana lys is of Variance 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Regression 4 0.030767 0.007692 7.56 0.000 
Res idua l Error 385 0.391929 0.001018 
Tota l 389 0.422696 
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Table 14a 
1-year MAAMRORsubIPOs versus SUB, Q-YR, B-YR, S-MKV and L-MKV 
The reg ress i on equa t i on i s : 
3-year MAAMROR lp0s = - 0.0205 - 0.0051 Q-YR - 0.0107 B-YR -
0.0015 S-MKV + 0.0058 L-MKV 
P r e d i c t o r C o e f f i c i e n t T - s t a t i s t i c s P-value 
Constant -0.0205* -7.96 0.000 
Q-YR -0.0051 -1.36 0.175 
B-YR -0.0107* -3.90 0.000 
S-MKV -0.0015 -0.52 0.605 
L-MKV 0.0058 1.87 0.062 
R2 = 4.9% 
* - s i g n i f i c a n t a t 5% l e v e l 
A n a l y s i s of Var iance 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Regress ion 4 0.0118792 0.0029698 4.95 0.001 
R e s i d u a l Er ror 385 0.2311611 0.0006004 
To t a l 389 0.2430402 
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Table 17 
Summary table of regression results 
Variables , 
Constant SUB Q-YR B-YR S-MKV L-MKV R2 
ROR 
Table 14a: 1-year -0.0136* 0.0069* -0.0007 -0.0164* -0.0230* 0.0095 15.4% 
MAAMRORsub
IPOs(0.019) (0.000) (0.926) (0.002) (0.000) (0.097) 
Table 14b: 2-year -0.0210* 0.0028* 0.0061 -0.0125* -0.0096* 0.0063 7.6% 
MAAMRORsub
IPOs (0.000) (0.004) (0.241) (0.001) (0.014) (0.124) 
Table 14c: 3-year -0.0228* 0.0020* -0.0034 -0.0096* -0.0032 0.0062 6.1% 
MAAMRORjPOs (0.000) (0.006) (0.383) (0.001) (0.286) (0.055) 
Table 15a: 1-year -0.0006 -0.0019 -0.0096 -0.0167* -0.0182* 0.0088 9.8% 
MAAMROR,POs (0.911) (0.135) (0.157) (0.001) (0.000) (0.102) 
Table 15b: 2-year -0.0145* -0.0016 0.0017 -0.0127* -0.0074 0.0059 7.9% 
MAAMRORIPOs (0.000) (0.100) (0.745) (0.001) (0.055) (0.142) 
Table 15c: 3-year -0.0184* -0.0009 -0.0063 -0.0097* -0.0017 0.0059 5.2% 
MAAMRORIPOs (0.000) (0.243) (0.106) (0.001) (0.561) (0.056) 
Table 16a:l-vear -0.0051 -0.0069 -0.0190* -0.0178* 0.0085 9.2% 
NIL … 
MAAMRORIPOs (0.247) (0.290) (0.000) (0.001) (0.113) 
Table 16b: 2-year -0.0183* 0.0039 -0.0145* -0.0071 0.0057 7.3% 
NIL 
MAAMROR,POs (0.000) (0.431) (0.000) (0.067) (0.158) 
Table 16c: 3-vear -0.0205* -0.0051 -0.0107* -0.0015 0.0058 4.9% 
NIL … 、 
MAAMROR1"08 (0.000) (0.175) (0.000) (0.605) (0.062) 
-* : significant at 5% level 
-P-values are in parentheses 
-ROR = Rates of return 
98 
Appendix 
List of IPO firms in Hong Kong from 1990 to 1998 that were included in this study 
Company name at time of listing Date of Listing Subscription Rate Market value at the end 
of the IPO year (in 
(dd/mm/yy) millions ofHK$) 
1 South China Morning Post (Holdings) Ltd 29/06/90 4.06 3938 
2 Hong Kong Toy Centre International Ltd 12/07/90 39.14 270 
3 Fu Hui Jewellery Co (H.K.) Ltd 02/10/90 1.30 333 
4 Fong's Industries Co Ltd 12/10/90 1.66 258 
5 Joyce Boutique Holdings Ltd 16/10/90 1.15 198 
6 Cheung Wah Development Co Ltd 20/10/90 20.40 154 
7 Tern Fat Hing Fung (Holdings) Ltd 21/11/90 12.47 574 
8 Swank International Manufacturing Co Ltd 30/11/90 24.00 263 
9 Yaohan International Caterers Ltd 12/12/90 24.70 441 
10 Techtronic Industries Co Ltd 17/12/90 4.85 270 y 
11 Golden Island (Holdings) Ltd 25/01/91 18.60 203 
12 Golden Resources Development International Ltd 28/01/91 22.80 443 
13 Process Automation (Holdings) Ltd 31/01/91 1.03 300 
14 Team Concepts Holdings Ltd 13/02/91 103.67 189 
15 Ming Pao Enterprise Corporation Ltd 22/03/91 26.70 878 
16 Chee Shing Holdings Ltd 26/03/91 50.00 453 
17 Great Wall Electronic International Ltd 15/04/91 58.40 1082 
18 Tung Wing Steel Holdings Ltd 30/04/91 63.30 265 
19 China Paint Holdings Ltd 21/05/91 153.20 589 
20 Frankie Dominion International Ltd 27/05/91 33.30 238 
21 Giordano Holdings Ltd 19/06/91 0.87 996 
22 Varitronix International Ltd 01/07/91 1.92 918 
23 Harbour Ring International Holding Ltd 05/07/91 4.31 1165 
24 Wo Kee Hong (Holdings) Ltd 16/07/91 5.84 1400 
25 Anex International Holdings Ltd 18/07/91 13.06 486 
26 Lam Soon Food Industries Ltd 24/07/91 10.00 813 
27 Benelux International Ltd 25/07/91 19.40 223 
28 Truly International Holdings Ltd 29/07/91 29.20 361 
29 Star Paging (International Holding) Ltd 01/08/91 5.70 299 
30 Hsin Chong Construction Group Ltd 14/08/91 15.90 540 
31 Yip's Hang Cheung (Holdings) Ltd 22/08/91 1.50 512 
32 Yau Lee Holdings Ltd 29/08/91 8.80 920 
33 Orient Power Holdings Ltd 02/09/91 2.43 250 
34 Acme Landis Holdings Ltd 16/09/91 5.15 162 
35 Righteous (Holdings) Ltd 16/09/91 27.50 222 
36 Leefung-Asco Printers Holdings Ltd 20/09/91 15.70 361 
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37 UDL Holdings Ltd 30/09/91 27.13 629 
38 Innovative International (Holdings) Ltd 03/10/91 4.76 540 
39 JCG Holdings Ltd 03/10/91 1.55 537 
40 International Pipe Ltd 07/10/91 1.57 271 
41 Management Investment & Technology (Holdings) Ltd 07/10/91 17.30 192 
42 ABC Communications (Holdings) Ltd 09/10/91 3.00 492 
43 Fairwood Holdings Ltd 09/10/91 28.80 682 
44 Yiu Wing International Holdings Ltd 21/10/91 6.30 408 
45 Cheun Hsong Holdings Ltd 22/10/91 5.34 1046 
46 Termbray Industries International (Holdings) Ltd 23/10/91 2.28 800 
47 Yanion International Holdings Ltd 25/10/91 8.43 366 
48 Tak Sing Alliance Holdings Ltd 01/11/91 2.90 363 
49 Double Kingdom Holdings Ltd 11/11/91 2.00 333 
50 Nam Pei Hong (Holding) Ltd 27/11/91 6.00 92 
51 Styland Holdings Ltd 05/12/91 15.90 264 
52 Jinhui Holdings Co Ltd 06/12/91 3.40 548 
53 Hanwah Holdings Ltd 10/12/91 2.63 522 
54 Far Eas Aluminium (Holdings) Ltd 12/12/91 1,80 278 
55 Hanny Magntics (Holdings) Ltd 16/12/91 1.28 852 
56 Top Form International Ltd 16/12/91 2.50 596 
57 Pak Fah Yeow International Ltd 18/12/91 48.60 187 
58 S. Megga International Holdings Ltd 30/12/91 3.20 441 
59 Silver Eagle Holdings Ltd 22/01/92 11.45 378 
60 Shun Shing Holdings Ltd 11/02/92 6.57 544 
61 Hoi Sing Holdings Ltd 13/02/92 29.20 137 
62 Climax International Co Ltd 11/03/92 27.71 788 
63 Hung Hing Printing Group Ltd 16/03/92 39.85 920 
64 Same Time Holdings Ltd 25/03/92 17.33 364 
65 Hansom Holdings Ltd 30/03/92 115.80 183 
66 Topstyle International Holdings Ltd 08/04/92 27.33 236 
67 Eastern Century Holdings Ltd 09/04/92 30.75 540 
68 Ocean Information Holdings Ltd 15/04/92 24.42 384 
69 Capital Automation Holdings Ltd 15/04/92 54.07 115 
70 Hop Ying International Holdings Ltd 15/04/92 24.16 210 
71 BALtrans Holdings Ltd 01/05/92 34.21 216 
72 Welback Holdings Ltd 10/06/92 94.29 185 
73 Li & Fung Ltd 01/07/92 28.15 1125 
74 Yue Yuen Industrial (Holdings) Ltd 02/07/92 44.39 3366 
75 Mansion Holdings Ltd 06/07/92 79.19 194 
76 Hai Hong Holdings Co Ltd 15/07/92 373.75 662 
77 High Fashion International Ltd 04/08/92 16.19 534 
78 Texwinca Holdings Ltd 06/08/92 91.62 689 
79 Winton Holdings (Bermuda) Ltd 13/08/92 17.75 779 
80 Indesen Industries Co Ltd 18/08/92 1.00 260 
81 SIS International Holdings Ltd 18/08/92 2.93 161 
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82 Champion Technology Holdings Ltd 19/08/92 90.93 1935 
83 Eu Yan Sang (Hong Kong) Ltd 19/08/92 237.82 131 
84 China Overs^s Land & Investment Ltd 20/08/92 98.67 4231 
85 Wai Kee Holdings Ltd 28/08/92 78.26 479 
86 Fung Cheung Kee Holdings Ltd 03/09/92 2.18 276 
87 Chung Tai Printing Holdings Ltd 10/09/92 1.50 180 
88 Pam & Frank International Holdings Ltd 16/09/92 21.61 608 
89 Goldlion Holdings Ltd 18/09/92 38.84 2608 
90 Ryoden Development Ltd 24/09/92 16.60 1320 
91 Ngai Lik Industrial Holdings Ltd 25/09/92 1.08 469 
92 Pico Far East Holdings Ltd 28/09/92 8.78 210 
93 Sharp Brave Holdings Ltd 30/09/92 1.09 388 
94 Shun Cheong Holdings Ltd 07/10/92 0.11 182 
95 Firstone International Holldings Ltd 08/10/92 53.57 255 
96 HKCB Bank Holding Co Ltd 12/10/92 48.29 1150 
97 Perfectech International Holdings Ltd 23/10/92 2.18 173 
98 Four Seas Travel International Ltd 27/10/92 309.30 154 
99 City Chiu Chow (Holdings) Ltd 30/10/92 57.82 161 
100 Allan International Holdings Ltd 10/11/92 57.78 277 
101 China Travel International Investment Hong Kong Ltd 11/11/92 412.23 3800 
102 Star Entertainment (International Holding) Ltd 12/11/92 7.99 101 
103 Watary International Holdings Ltd 23/11/92 259.49 684 
104 Lamex Holdings Ltd 26/11/92 305.14 418 
105 Alco Holdings Ltd 27/11/92 25.75 270 
106 Leung Kee Holdings Ltd 02/12/92 30.22 126 
107 LeSaunda Holdings Ltd 11/12/92 64.07 656 
108 Guangzhou Investment Co Ltd 15/12/92 230.46 2380 
109 Yaohan Food Processing & Trading Co, Ltd 16/12/92 15.28 385 
110 Prod Art Technology (Holdings) Ltd 05/01/93 9.31 1349 
111 Leading Spirit (Holdings) Co Ltd 18/01/93 365.21 1218 
112 Group Sense (International) Ltd 28/01 /93 281.90 1464 
113 AWT World Transport Holdings Ltd 03/02/93 81.15 434 
114 Nority International Group Ltd 05/02/93 38.92 233 
115 Chun Wo Holdings Ltd 12/02/93 9.60 376 
116 ack Hsin Holdings Ltd 12/02/93 553.40 399 
117 Peace Mark (Holdings) Ltd 18/02/93 57.08 \ 10 
118 Denway Investment Ltd 22/02/93 658.38 3201 
119 Kosonic International Holdings Ltd 03/03/93 145.30 452 
120 Starlite Holdings Ltd 03/03/93 56.53 474 
121 Lung Kee (Bermuda) Holdings Ltd 05/03/93 311.63 470 
122 Linkful International Holdings Ltd 30/03/93 7.91 1535 
123 K. P. I. Co Ltd 07/04/93 228.44 435 
124 Wing Shan International Ltd 07/04/93 227.78 775 
125 World Houseware (Holdings) Ltd 15/04/93 12.17 1232 
126 New Island Printing Holdings Ltd 19/04/93 53.51 236 
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127 Wanon International Holdings Ltd 19/04/93 99.21 507 
128 Dransfield Holdings Ltd 30/04/93 204.01 304 
129 Golden Power International Holdings Ltd 28/05/93 209.81 248 
130 Shangri-La Asia Ltd 17/06/93 108.04 11500 
131 Egana International (Holdings) Ltd 25/06/93 2.98 1315 
132 Manhattan Card Co Ltd 02/07/93 40.96 5821 
133 Wing Hang Bank, Ltd 02/07/93 109.73 6934 
134 Fortei Holdings Ltd 08/07/93 21.05 920 
135 Singamas Container Holdings Ltd 08/07/93 14.07 795 
136 Rhine Holdings Ltd 14/07/93 17.03 618 
137 Tsingtao Brewery Co Ltd- H Shares 15/07/93 110.47 3382 
138 South China Brokerage Co Ltd 16/07/93 11.83 1150 
139 CIL Holdings Ltd 21/07/93 83.83 715 
140 Shanghai Petrochemical Co Ltd- H Shares 26/07/93 1.73 5460 
141 Ultronics International Holdings Ltd 27/07/93 85.78 410 
142 Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd- H Shares 06/08/93 25.36 675 
143 Guanghou Shipyard International Co Ltd- H Shares 06/08/93 76.96 874 
144 Stone Electronic Technology Ltd 16/08/93 41.78 2416 
145 Four Sea Mercantile Holdings Ltd 25/08/93 562.24 736 
146 Yeebo (International Holdings) Ltd 01/09/93 126.91 774 
147 Vincent Intertrans (Holdings) Ltd 10/09/93 254.32 327 
148 Companion Building Material (Holdings) Ltd 20/09/93 470.86 917 
149 Paul Y.-ITC Construction Holdings Ltd 21/09/93 125.88 1845 
150 DahHwa International (Holdings) Ltd 05/10/93 17.63 255 
151 Moulin International Holdings Ltd 05/10/93 87.57 890 
152 Kingboard Chemical Holdings Ltd 08/10/93 110.05 900 
153 Oriental Watch Holdings Ltd 12/10/93 27.43 407 
154 Recor Holdings Ltd 13/10/93 6.30 388 
155 Dharmala Holdings Ltd 15/10/93 27.40 557 
156 Gold-Face Holdings Ltd 15/10/93 19.42 7 5 6 
157 Mei Ah International Ltd 18/10/93 107.28 438 
158 Yaohan International Holdings Ltd 27/10/93 41.69 2 7 6 9 
159 Siu-Fung Ceramics Holdings Ltd 28/10/93 37.98 4 5 1 6 
160 Maanshan Iron & Steel Co Ltd- H Shares 03/11/93 68.69 7 4 5 2 
161 International Bank of Asia Ltd 08/11/93 23.34 3530 
162 Yugang International Ltd 12/11/93 143.22 6 0 8 
163 Ankor Group Ltd 16/11/93 88.47 1 2 2 8 
164 Kunming Machine Tool Co Ltd- H Shares 07/12/93 628.44 387 
165 Esprit Asia Holdings Ltd 09/12/93 195.44 3038 
166 DaoHeng Bank Group Ltd 16/12/93 278.71 2 1 9 8 1 
167 Paliburg Development Ltd 17/12/93 9.78 3 8 7 0 
168 Hualing Holdings Ltd 20/12/93 351.54 1 6 0 5 
169 KTP Holdings Ltd 22/12/93 104.32 1 5 2 9 
170 Arnhold Holdings Ltd 10/01/94 583.00 2 2 7 
171 Pearl Oriental Holdings Ltd 21/01/94 34.50 1 4 2 0 
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172 Theme Int'l Holdings Ltd 25/01/94 347.00 349 
173 Albatronics (Far East) Co Ltd 27/01/94 226.00 228 
174 Contrad Int'l Holdings Ltd 02/02/94 215.00 273 
175 Nam Hing Holdings Ltd 02/02/94 259.00 291 
176 Jusco Stores (Hong Kong) Co Ltd 04/02/94 356.00 221 
177 Legend Holdings Ltd 14/02/94 405.00 662 
178 Simsen Metals (Holdings) Ltd 16/02/94 189.50 126 
179 Pricerite Group Ltd 17/02/94 10.50 232 
180 Matrix Holdings Ltd 18/02/94 16.00 246 
181 Van Shung Chong Holdings Ltd 18/02/94 112.60 414 
182 Win Win Int’l Holdings Ltd 18/02/94 65.00 210 
183 Rockapetta Holdings Ltd 21/02/94 6.40 202 
184 Chaifa Holdings Ltd 15/03/94 1.90 174 
185 Cheung Tai Hong Holdings Ltd 18/03/94 1.23 188 
186 Yizheng Chemical Fibre Co Ltd - H Share 29/03/94 20.21 2875 
187 Vitasoy Int'l Holdings Ltd 30/03/94 50.00 1361 
188 Daiwa Associate Holdings Ltd 14/04/94 1.20 98 
189 Ngai Hing Hong Co Ltd 25/04/94 1.80 192 
190 Cheerful Holdings Ltd 27/04/94 4.15 213 
191 All Pantronic Holdings Ltd 28/04/94 2.00 193 
192 Rich City Packaging Holdings Ltd 29/04/94 3.20 429 
193 HB Int'l Holdings Ltd 10/05/94 2.87 329 
194 Interform Ceramics Technologies Ltd 12/05/94 1.07 366 
195 Tianjin Bohai Chemical Industry (Group) Co Ltd - H Share 17/05/94 1.00 316 
196 Dongfang Electrical Machinery Co Ltd - H Share 06/06/94 15.10 599 
197 China Pharmaceutical Ent & Inv Corp 21/06/94 3.27 516 
198 Sinocan Holdings Ltd 22/06/94 4.60 1376 
199 Luoyang Glass Co Ltd - H Share 08/07/94 1.02 738 
200 Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd 11/07/94 10.00 3600 
201 Dah Bang (Holdings) Ltd 15/07/94 0.80 200 
202 Qingling Motors Co Ltd - H Share 17/08/94 23.50 2352 
203 China-Hongkong Photo Products Hldg Ltd 19/09/94 1.60 1590 
204 Kingmaker Footwear Holdings Ltd 29/09/94 10.30 302 
205 Pacific Andes Int'l Holdings Ltd 03/10/94 5.36 375 
206 Ideal Pacific Holdings Ltd 17/10/94 0.80 233 
207 S.A.S. Dragon Holdings Ltd 17/10/94 3.31 331 
208 Wing Fai Int'l Ltd 26/10/94 0.22 268 
209 Logic Int'l Holdings Ltd 07/11/94 3.10 300 
210 Shanghai Hai Xing Shipping Co Ltd - H Share 11/11/94 13.95 1598 
211 Golden Harvest Entertainment Holdings Ltd 23/11/94 51.80 830 
212 Zhenhai Refining & Chemical Co Ltd - H Share 02/12/94 6.53 " 8 2 
213 Guangnan (Holdings) Ltd 09/12/94 50.90 546 
214 Chengdu Tele Cable Co Ltd - H Share 13/12/94 5.91 416 
215 Oriental Metals (Holdings) Co Ltd 15/12/94 0.64 611 
216 Harbin Power Equipment Co Ltd-H Share 16/12/94 1.40 I 1 3 1 
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217 Florens Group Ltd 19/12/94 0.65 2703 
218 Easyknit Int'l Holdings Ltd 30/01/95 1.41 1239 
219 Wang On Group Ltd 28/02/95 1.18 296 
220 Liang Shing (Holdings) Ltd 01 /03/95 1.01 115 
221 Whimsy Entertainment Co Ltd 06/04/95 3.04 230 
222 Artfield Group Ltd 13/04/95 1.04 342 
223 Vanda Systems & Communications Hdgs Ltd 18/04/95 1.03 297 
224 Jilin Chemical Industrial Co Ltd - H Share 23/05/95 2.33 1544 
225 Midland Realty (Holdings) Ltd 08/06/95 1.81 378 
226 Northeast Elec T&T Machinery Mfg Co Ltd- H Share 06/07/95 2.51 325 
227 Tomorrow Int'l Holdings Ltd 08/08/95 1.10 348 
228 Aeon Credit Service (Asia) Co Ltd 14/09/95 14.07 557 
229 Luen Fat Hong Int'l Holdings Ltd 02/10/95 6.48 474 
230 Magician Industries (Holdings) Ltd 11/10/95 1.60 496 
231 Gilbert Holdings Ltd 12/10/95 5.54 354 
232 Iwai's Int'l Holdings Ltd 20/10/95 2.55 97 
233 Ng Fung Hong Ltd 25/10/95 109.91 3400 
234 New World Infrastructure Ltd 27/10/95 19.60 11131 
235 Prime Success Int'l Group Ltd 03/11/95 9.98 605 
236 First Sign Int'l Holdings Ltd 16/11/95 3.30 1024 
237 Pacific Plywood Holdings Ltd 20/11/95 2.16 1144 
238 Samson Paper Holdings Ltd 01/12/95 1.05 376 
239 CIG-WH Int'l (Holdings) Ltd 18/12/95 10.15 200 
240 China Apollo Holdings Ltd 19/12/95 0.22 848 
241 Founder (Hong Kong) Ltd 21/12/95 3.01 885 
242 RBI Holdings Ltd 29/01/96 3.23 239 
243 Jiangwei Textile Machinery Co Ltd - H Share 02/02/96 2.42 250 
244 Tingyi (Cayman Islands) Holdings Corp 05/02/96 3.18 8459 
245 Jet Air Int'l Group Ltd 26/03/96 2.27 898 
246 Henderson China Holdings Ltd 28/03/96 3.39 6582 
247 Elegance Int'l Holdings Ltd 11/04/96 9.29 390 
248 AV Concept Holdings Ltd 24/04/96 8.59 138 
249 Nanj ing Panda Electronics Co Ltd - H Share 02/05/96 1.01 411 
250 Victory City Int'l Holdings Ltd 13/05/96 3.60 130 
251 Guangshen Railway Co Ltd - H Share 14/05/96 7.03 4795 
252 China Elegance Int'l Fashion Ltd 24/05/96 66.48 1080 
253 Shanghai Industrial Holdings Ltd 30/05/96 158.31 19665 
254 Midas Printing Group Ltd 12/06/96 55.31 221 
255 Asia Satellite Telecom Holdings Ltd 19/06/96 100.08 7001 
256 Kwong On Bank Ltd 24/06/96 23.88 3413 
257 Road King Infrastructure Ltd 04/07/96 2.10 3703 
258 Perfect Treasure Holdings Ltd 10/07/96 53.73 850 
259 Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Ltd 17/07/96 23.24 28044 
260 Guangdong Kelon Electrical Holdings Co Ltd - H Share 23/07/96 1.03 1915 
261 Stime Watch Int’l Holding Ltd 23/07/96 28.96 270 
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262 Kerry Properties Ltd 05/08/96 1.03 21660 
263 Tai Fook Securities Group Ltd 06/08/96 29.30 660 
264 Glorious Sun Enterprises Ltd 17/09/96 236.64 3225 
265 Kwoon Chung Bus Holdings Ltd 25/09/96 53.46 519 
266 Wah Tak Fung Holdings Ltd 30/09/96 10.64 789 
267 Pegasus Int'l Holdings Ltd 11/10/96 17.48 714 
268 Honko Int'l Holdings Ltd 14/10/96 34.34 196 
269 SmarTone Telecomm Holdings Ltd 31/10/96 2.95 7104 
270 Concord Land Development Co Ltd 07/11/96 1.53 4020 
271 Arts Optical Int'l Holdings Ltd 08/11/96 260.95 521 
272 China Resources Beijing Land Ltd 08/11/96 125.65 6101 
273 Anhui Expressway Co Ltd - H Share 13/11/96 1.04 1072 
274 Jackin Int'l Holdings Ltd 28/11/96 257.90 429 
275 Citybus Group Ltd 29/11/96 18.21 2050 
276 RNA Holdings Ltd 02/12/96 29.93 729 
277 Mirabell Int'l Holdings Ltd 06/12/96 190.53 295 
278 Nam Fong Int'l Holdings Ltd 09/12/96 165.64 4658 
279 Solartech Int’l Holdings Ltd 12/12/96 122.07 755 
280 Guangdong Tannery Ltd 16/12/96 60.72 349 
281 Karrie Int'l Holdings Ltd 16/12/96 667.01 858 
282 APT Satellite Holdings Ltd 18/12/96 0.66 5376 
283 Ta Fu Int'l Holdings Ltd 27/12/96 148.29 1028 
284 Perennial Int'l Ltd 30/12/96 2.03 286 
285 Shangdong Xinhua Pharm Co Ltd - H Share 31/12/96 73.75 332 
286 K&P Int'l H Ltd 02/01/97 13.13 158 
287 FT Holdings Int'l Ltd 03/01/97 7.48 152 
288 Wah Lee Resources Holdings Ltd 17/01/97 32.59 502 
289 Cheong Ming Holdings Ltd 20/01/97 16.89 133 
290 Yip's Pota Int'l Co Ltd 20/01/97 6.74 92 
291 GZI Transport Ltd 30/01/97 528.48 2698 
292 Chun Tai Holdings Ltd 03/02/97 169.41 253 
293 Shui On Construction & Mat,l Ltd 03/02/97 14.03 1534 
294 China Eastern Airlines Corp Ltd - H Share 05/02/97 22.75 1959 
295 Man Yue Int'l Holdings Ltd 05/03/97 10.15 220 
296 Peking Apparel Int'l Group Ltd 07/03/97 131.21 208 
297 Shum Yip Investment Ltd 07/03/97 437.79 3164 
298 Boto Int’l Holdings Ltd 10/03/97 12.58 493 
299 Shenzhen Expressway Co Ltd - H Share 12/03/97 36.68 1 1 2 1 
300 Kwong Hing Int'l Holdings Ltd 19/03/97 9.35 4 4 8 
301 Beijing Datang Power Generation Co Ltd - H Share 21/03/97 80.33 5 0 7 9 
302 Soundwill Holdings Ltd 21/03/97 9.69 1 4 8 9 
303 GITIC Enterprises Ltd 26/03/97 891.83 8 8 1 
304 Wing Lee Holdings Ltd 10/04/97 312.92 127 
305 KEL Holdings Ltd 24/04/97 173.20 200 
306 Pacific Ports Co Ltd 25/04/97 141.00 1164 
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307 Kin Yat Holdings Ltd 01/05/97 523.00 214 
308 Luk Fook Holdings (Int'l) Ltd 06/05/97 111.10 242 
309 Beijing North Star Co Ltd - H Share 14/05/97 397.00 912 
310 Dragonfield Holdings Ltd 15/05/97 67.60 187 
311 Zhejiang Expressway Co Ltd - H Share 15/05/97 118.00 2251 
312 Regent Pacific Group Ltd 19/05/97 12.10 2239 
313 Chu Kong Shipping Development Co Ltd 23/05/97 480.00 1215 
314 Lee & Man Holdings Ltd 28/05/97 25.00 866 
315 Beijing Enterprises Holdings Ltd 29/05/97 1276.00 12388 
316 Benefun Int'l Holdings Ltd 03/06/97 106.00 172 
317 Deson Development Int'l Holdings Ltd 10/06/97 166.00 222 
318 Jiangxi Copper Co Ltd - H Share 12/06/97 32.90 995 
319 Sa Sa Int'l Holdings Ltd 13/06/97 531.00 2177 
320 Proview Int'l Holdings Ltd 18/06/97 116.00 312 
321 First Tractor Co Ltd - H Share 23/06/97 296.40 1566 
322 Beijing Yanhua Petrochemical Co Ltd - H Share 25/06/97 11.30 160 
323 Fairform Holdings Ltd 25/06/97 56.80 1518 
324 Leading Spirit Conrowa Electric Co Ltd 26/06/97 112.57 6364 
325 OLS Group Ltd 26/06/97 16.95 252 
326 Jiangsu Expressway Co Ltd - H Share 27/06/97 2.45 1955 
327 Angang New Steel Co Ltd - H Share 24/07/97 0.90 1024 
328 Winsan (China) Investment Gp Co Ltd 25/07/97 1.30 610 
329 China Southern Airlines Co Ltd - H Share 31/07/97 2.44 2348 
330 Alpha General (Holdings) Ltd 07/08/97 41.00 1 5 5 
331 Guangdong Brewery Holdings Ltd 08/08/97 38.50 1375 
332 CASIL Tele Holdings Ltd 11/08/97 71.01 1 6 9 5 
333 South East Asia Wood Ind Holdings Ltd 08/09/97 61.90 378 
334 Global Food Culture Group Ltd 18/09/97 164.50 418 
335 Ocean Grand Holdings Ltd 23/09/97 40.80 251 
336 Wah Fu Int'l Holdings Ltd 24/09/97 101.99 95 
337 Mascotte Holdings Ltd 25/09/97 69.41 1 6 2 
338 Man Sang Int'l Ltd 26/09/97 108.30 302 
339 CATIC Shenzhen Holdings Ltd - H Share 29/09/97 652.58 2 8 1 
340 Lung Cheong Int'l Holdings Ltd 30/09/97 53.24 304 
341 Kessel Int'l Holdings Ltd 03/10/97 23.00 131 
342 Ananda Wing On Travel (Holdings) Ltd 06/10/97 53.10 1 6 2 3 
343 TCC Hong Kong Cement Holdings Ltd 06/10/97 176.60 6 1 0 
344 Sichuan Expressway Co Ltd - H Share 07/10/97 1.78 8 8 6 
345 Yue Fung Int'l Group Holdings Ltd 08/10/97 40.45 101 
346 Rising Development Holdings Ltd 09/10/97 40.80 1 3 6 
347 Zhong Hua Land Holdings Ltd 13/10/97 6.50 1 0 6 2 
348 Takson Holdings Ltd 15/10/97 23.80 1 3 3 
349 Coastal Realty Group Ltd 16/10/97 1.15 4 9 9 
350 Tonic Industries Holdings Ltd 16/10/97 16.10 4 9 8 
351 Chongqing Iron & Steel Co Ltd - H Share 17/10/97 0.77 4 3 9 
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352 Anhui Conch Cement Co Ltd - H Share 21/10/97 1.16 487 
353 China Telecom (HK) Ltd 23/10/97 35.20 156684 
354 Wing Lee World Transport Holdings Ltd 24/10/97 3.68 240 
355 Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Co Ltd - H Share 30/10/97 1.13 229 
356 Automated Systems Holdings Ltd 05/11/97 0.58 196 
357 Lai Fung Holdings Ltd 28/11/97 1.47 2675 
358 Tianjin Development Holdings Ltd 10/12/97 9.01 4333 
359 China National Aviation Co Ltd 17/12/97 1.15 500 
360 GKC Holdings Ltd 17/12/97 18.18 5306 
361 Kin Wing Chinney Holdings Ltd 18/12/97 1.24 173 
362 Wiltec Holdings Ltd 23/12/97 1.60 154 
363 Q-Tech Holdings Ltd 12/01/98 0.42 32 
364 Peaktop Int'l Holdings Ltd 15/01/98 0.70 179 
365 Kim Eng Holdings (HK) Ltd 16/01/98 1.11 324 
366 Victory Group Ltd 16/02/98 1.34 173 
367 Hung Fung Group Holdings Ltd 12/03/98 1.02 68 
368 Karce Int'l Holdings Co Ltd 13/03/98 1.26 280 
369 Yanzhou Coal Mining Co Ltd - H Share 01/04/98 1.58 1 1 0 5 
370 Asia Aluminum Holdings Ltd 03/04/98 1.09 793 
371 Computer & Technologies Holdings Ltd 18/05/98 4.40 6 8 
372 Zhu Kuan Development Co Ltd 26/05/98 10.32 265 
373 Hopson Development Holdings Ltd 27/05/98 1.14 8 7 0 
374 Sinolink Worldwide Holdings Ltd 08/06/98 1.18 6 4 6 
375 Gemzboh Holdings Ltd 17/06/98 1.03 2 9 8 
376 Kith Holdings Ltd 23/06/98 1.13 269 
377 Corasia Group Ltd 03/07/98 1.04 1 5 4 
378 Dong Jian Group Holdings Ltd 15/07/98 1.11 2 4 8 
379 Futart Int'l Co Ltd 22/07/98 1.01 291 
380 Wonson Int'l Holdings Ltd 23/07/98 1.08 4 6 6 
381 Multifield Int'l Holdings Ltd 31/07/98 1.05 4 0 0 
382 Kin Don Holdings Ltd 09/09/98 1.30 5 8 5 
383 Pacific Challenge Holdings Ltd 13/10/98 1.17 1 4 6 
384 Wah Yik Holdings Co Ltd 14/10/98 1.12 2 0 8 
385 Good Fellow Group Ltd 01/12/98 1.77 204 
386 MAE Holdings Ltd 02/12/98 1.38 1 9 4 
387 Luen Cheong Tai Int'l Holdings Ltd 04/12/98 1.04 1 4 0 
388 Hengan Int'l Group Co Ltd 08/12/98 36.50 2 8 6 3 
389 Lerado Group (Holding) Co Ltd 18/12/98 3.30 6 3 4 
390 Ying Wing Holdings Ltd 29/12/98 1.66 2 2 2 
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